For local communications (npipe://, unix://), the hostname is not used,
but we need valid and meaningful hostname.
The current code used the socket path as hostname, which gets rejected by
go1.20.6 and go1.19.11 because of a security fix for [CVE-2023-29406 ][1],
which was implemented in https://go.dev/issue/60374.
Prior versions go Go would clean the host header, and strip slashes in the
process, but go1.20.6 and go1.19.11 no longer do, and reject the host
header.
Before this patch, tests would fail on go1.20.6:
=== FAIL: pkg/authorization TestAuthZRequestPlugin (15.01s)
time="2023-07-12T12:53:45Z" level=warning msg="Unable to connect to plugin: //tmp/authz2422457390/authz-test-plugin.sock/AuthZPlugin.AuthZReq: Post \"http://%2F%2Ftmp%2Fauthz2422457390%2Fauthz-test-plugin.sock/AuthZPlugin.AuthZReq\": http: invalid Host header, retrying in 1s"
time="2023-07-12T12:53:46Z" level=warning msg="Unable to connect to plugin: //tmp/authz2422457390/authz-test-plugin.sock/AuthZPlugin.AuthZReq: Post \"http://%2F%2Ftmp%2Fauthz2422457390%2Fauthz-test-plugin.sock/AuthZPlugin.AuthZReq\": http: invalid Host header, retrying in 2s"
time="2023-07-12T12:53:48Z" level=warning msg="Unable to connect to plugin: //tmp/authz2422457390/authz-test-plugin.sock/AuthZPlugin.AuthZReq: Post \"http://%2F%2Ftmp%2Fauthz2422457390%2Fauthz-test-plugin.sock/AuthZPlugin.AuthZReq\": http: invalid Host header, retrying in 4s"
time="2023-07-12T12:53:52Z" level=warning msg="Unable to connect to plugin: //tmp/authz2422457390/authz-test-plugin.sock/AuthZPlugin.AuthZReq: Post \"http://%2F%2Ftmp%2Fauthz2422457390%2Fauthz-test-plugin.sock/AuthZPlugin.AuthZReq\": http: invalid Host header, retrying in 8s"
authz_unix_test.go:82: Failed to authorize request Post "http://%2F%2Ftmp%2Fauthz2422457390%2Fauthz-test-plugin.sock/AuthZPlugin.AuthZReq": http: invalid Host header
[1]: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-f8f7-69v5-w4vx
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
(cherry picked from commit 6b7705d5b2)
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
For local communications (npipe://, unix://), the hostname is not used,
but we need valid and meaningful hostname.
The current code used the client's `addr` as hostname in some cases, which
could contain the path for the unix-socket (`/var/run/docker.sock`), which
gets rejected by go1.20.6 and go1.19.11 because of a security fix for
[CVE-2023-29406 ][1], which was implemented in https://go.dev/issue/60374.
Prior versions go Go would clean the host header, and strip slashes in the
process, but go1.20.6 and go1.19.11 no longer do, and reject the host
header.
This patch introduces a `DummyHost` const, and uses this dummy host for
cases where we don't need an actual hostname.
Before this patch (using go1.20.6):
make GO_VERSION=1.20.6 TEST_FILTER=TestAttach test-integration
=== RUN TestAttachWithTTY
attach_test.go:46: assertion failed: error is not nil: http: invalid Host header
--- FAIL: TestAttachWithTTY (0.11s)
=== RUN TestAttachWithoutTTy
attach_test.go:46: assertion failed: error is not nil: http: invalid Host header
--- FAIL: TestAttachWithoutTTy (0.02s)
FAIL
With this patch applied:
make GO_VERSION=1.20.6 TEST_FILTER=TestAttach test-integration
INFO: Testing against a local daemon
=== RUN TestAttachWithTTY
--- PASS: TestAttachWithTTY (0.12s)
=== RUN TestAttachWithoutTTy
--- PASS: TestAttachWithoutTTy (0.02s)
PASS
[1]: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-f8f7-69v5-w4vx
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
(cherry picked from commit 92975f0c11)
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
Calling function returned from setupTest (which calls testEnv.Clean) in
a defer block inside a test that spawns parallel subtests caused the
cleanup function to be called before any of the subtest did anything.
Change the defer expressions to use `t.Cleanup` instead to call it only
after all subtests have also finished.
This only changes tests which have parallel subtests.
Signed-off-by: Paweł Gronowski <pawel.gronowski@docker.com>
(cherry picked from commit f9e2eed55d)
Signed-off-by: Paweł Gronowski <pawel.gronowski@docker.com>
The daemon.lazyInitializeVolume() function only handles restoring Volumes
if a Driver is specified. The Container's MountPoints field may also
contain other kind of mounts (e.g., bind-mounts). Those were ignored, and
don't return an error; 1d9c8619cd/daemon/volumes.go (L243-L252C2)
However, the prepareMountPoints() assumed each MountPoint was a volume,
and logged an informational message about the volume being restored;
1d9c8619cd/daemon/mounts.go (L18-L25)
This would panic if the MountPoint was not a volume;
github.com/docker/docker/daemon.(*Daemon).prepareMountPoints(0xc00054b7b8?, 0xc0007c2500)
/root/rpmbuild/BUILD/src/engine/.gopath/src/github.com/docker/docker/daemon/mounts.go:24 +0x1c0
github.com/docker/docker/daemon.(*Daemon).restore.func5(0xc0007c2500, 0x0?)
/root/rpmbuild/BUILD/src/engine/.gopath/src/github.com/docker/docker/daemon/daemon.go:552 +0x271
created by github.com/docker/docker/daemon.(*Daemon).restore
/root/rpmbuild/BUILD/src/engine/.gopath/src/github.com/docker/docker/daemon/daemon.go:530 +0x8d8
panic: runtime error: invalid memory address or nil pointer dereference
[signal SIGSEGV: segmentation violation code=0x1 addr=0x30 pc=0x564e9be4c7c0]
This issue was introduced in 647c2a6cdd
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
(cherry picked from commit a490248f4d)
Signed-off-by: Cory Snider <csnider@mirantis.com>
Multiple daemons starting/running concurrently can collide with each
other when editing iptables rules. Most integration tests which opt into
parallelism and start daemons work around this problem by starting the
daemon with the --iptables=false option. However, some of the tests
neglect to pass the option when starting or restarting the daemon,
resulting in those tests being flaky.
Audit the integration tests which call t.Parallel() and (*Daemon).Stop()
and add --iptables=false arguments where needed.
Signed-off-by: Cory Snider <csnider@mirantis.com>
(cherry picked from commit cdcb7c28c5)
Signed-off-by: Cory Snider <csnider@mirantis.com>
TestClientWithRequestTimeout has been observed to flake in CI. The
timing in the test is quite tight, only giving the client a 10ms window
to time out, which could potentially be missed if the host is under
load and the goroutine scheduling is unlucky. Give the client a full
five seconds of grace to time out before failing the test.
Signed-off-by: Cory Snider <csnider@mirantis.com>
(cherry picked from commit 9cee34bc94)
Signed-off-by: Cory Snider <csnider@mirantis.com>
Linux 6.2 and up (commit [f1f1f2569901ec5b9d425f2e91c09a0e320768f3][1])
provides a fast path for the number of open files for the process.
From the [Linux docs][2]:
> The number of open files for the process is stored in 'size' member of
> `stat()` output for /proc/<pid>/fd for fast access.
[1]: f1f1f25699
[2]: https://docs.kernel.org/filesystems/proc.html#proc-pid-fd-list-of-symlinks-to-open-files
This patch adds a fast-path for Kernels that support this, and falls back
to the slow path if the Size fields is zero.
Comparing on a Fedora 38 (kernel 6.2.9-300.fc38.x86_64):
Before/After:
go test -bench ^BenchmarkGetTotalUsedFds$ -run ^$ ./pkg/fileutils/
BenchmarkGetTotalUsedFds 57264 18595 ns/op 408 B/op 10 allocs/op
BenchmarkGetTotalUsedFds 370392 3271 ns/op 40 B/op 3 allocs/op
Note that the slow path has 1 more file-descriptor, due to the open
file-handle for /proc/<pid>/fd during the calculation.
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
(cherry picked from commit ec79d0fc05)
Resolved conflicts:
pkg/fileutils/fileutils_linux.go
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Neergaard <bjorn.neergaard@docker.com>
Use File.Readdirnames instead of os.ReadDir, as we're only interested in
the number of files, and results don't have to be sorted.
Before:
BenchmarkGetTotalUsedFds-5 149272 7896 ns/op 945 B/op 20 allocs/op
After:
BenchmarkGetTotalUsedFds-5 153517 7644 ns/op 408 B/op 10 allocs/op
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
(cherry picked from commit eaa9494b71)
Resolved conflicts:
pkg/fileutils/fileutils_linux.go
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Neergaard <bjorn.neergaard@docker.com>
Commit 8d56108ffb moved this function from
the generic (no build-tags) fileutils.go to a unix file, adding "freebsd"
to the build-tags.
This likely was a wrong assumption (as other files had freebsd build-tags).
FreeBSD's procfs does not mention `/proc/<pid>/fd` in the manpage, and
we don't test FreeBSD in CI, so let's drop it, and make this a Linux-only
file.
While updating also dropping the import-tag, as we're planning to move
this file internal to the daemon.
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
(cherry picked from commit 252e94f499)
Resolved conflicts:
pkg/fileutils/fileutils_linux.go
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Neergaard <bjorn.neergaard@docker.com>
CI failed sometimes if no daemon.json was present:
Run sudo rm /etc/docker/daemon.json
sudo rm /etc/docker/daemon.json
sudo service docker restart
docker version
docker info
shell: /usr/bin/bash -e {0}
env:
DESTDIR: ./build
BUILDKIT_REPO: moby/buildkit
BUILDKIT_TEST_DISABLE_FEATURES: cache_backend_azblob,cache_backend_s3,merge_diff
BUILDKIT_REF: 798ad6b0ce9f2fe86dfb2b0277e6770d0b545871
rm: cannot remove '/etc/docker/daemon.json': No such file or directory
Error: Process completed with exit code 1.
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
(cherry picked from commit 264dbad43a)
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
When live-restoring a container the volume driver needs be notified that
there is an active mount for the volume.
Before this change the count is zero until the container stops and the
uint64 overflows pretty much making it so the volume can never be
removed until another daemon restart.
Signed-off-by: Brian Goff <cpuguy83@gmail.com>
(cherry picked from commit 647c2a6cdd)
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Neergaard <bjorn.neergaard@docker.com>
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
I think this may be missing a sudo (as all other operations do use
sudo to access daemon.json);
Run if [ ! -e /etc/docker/daemon.json ]; then
if [ ! -e /etc/docker/daemon.json ]; then
echo '{}' | tee /etc/docker/daemon.json >/dev/null
fi
DOCKERD_CONFIG=$(jq '.+{"experimental":true,"live-restore":true,"ipv6":true,"fixed-cidr-v6":"2001:db8:1::/64"}' /etc/docker/daemon.json)
sudo tee /etc/docker/daemon.json <<<"$DOCKERD_CONFIG" >/dev/null
sudo service docker restart
shell: /usr/bin/bash --noprofile --norc -e -o pipefail {0}
env:
GO_VERSION: 1.20.5
GOTESTLIST_VERSION: v0.3.1
TESTSTAT_VERSION: v0.1.3
ITG_CLI_MATRIX_SIZE: 6
DOCKER_EXPERIMENTAL: 1
DOCKER_GRAPHDRIVER: overlay2
tee: /etc/docker/daemon.json: Permission denied
Error: Process completed with exit code 1.
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
(cherry picked from commit d8bc5828cd)
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
Added code to correctly retrieve and convert the Topology from the gRPC
Swarm Node.
Signed-off-by: Drew Erny <derny@mirantis.com>
(cherry picked from commit cdb1293eea)
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
go1.20.5 (released 2023-06-06) includes four security fixes to the cmd/go and
runtime packages, as well as bug fixes to the compiler, the go command, the
runtime, and the crypto/rsa, net, and os packages. See the Go 1.20.5 milestone
on our issue tracker for details:
https://github.com/golang/go/issues?q=milestone%3AGo1.20.5+label%3ACherryPickApproved
full diff: https://github.com/golang/go/compare/go1.20.4...go1.20.5
These minor releases include 3 security fixes following the security policy:
- cmd/go: cgo code injection
The go command may generate unexpected code at build time when using cgo. This
may result in unexpected behavior when running a go program which uses cgo.
This may occur when running an untrusted module which contains directories with
newline characters in their names. Modules which are retrieved using the go command,
i.e. via "go get", are not affected (modules retrieved using GOPATH-mode, i.e.
GO111MODULE=off, may be affected).
Thanks to Juho Nurminen of Mattermost for reporting this issue.
This is CVE-2023-29402 and Go issue https://go.dev/issue/60167.
- runtime: unexpected behavior of setuid/setgid binaries
The Go runtime didn't act any differently when a binary had the setuid/setgid
bit set. On Unix platforms, if a setuid/setgid binary was executed with standard
I/O file descriptors closed, opening any files could result in unexpected
content being read/written with elevated prilieges. Similarly if a setuid/setgid
program was terminated, either via panic or signal, it could leak the contents
of its registers.
Thanks to Vincent Dehors from Synacktiv for reporting this issue.
This is CVE-2023-29403 and Go issue https://go.dev/issue/60272.
- cmd/go: improper sanitization of LDFLAGS
The go command may execute arbitrary code at build time when using cgo. This may
occur when running "go get" on a malicious module, or when running any other
command which builds untrusted code. This is can by triggered by linker flags,
specified via a "#cgo LDFLAGS" directive.
Thanks to Juho Nurminen of Mattermost for reporting this issue.
This is CVE-2023-29404 and CVE-2023-29405 and Go issues https://go.dev/issue/60305 and https://go.dev/issue/60306.
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
(cherry picked from commit 98a44bb18e)
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
(cherry picked from commit 24c882c3e0)
Signed-off-by: Cory Snider <csnider@mirantis.com>
go1.20.4 (released 2023-05-02) includes three security fixes to the html/template
package, as well as bug fixes to the compiler, the runtime, and the crypto/subtle,
crypto/tls, net/http, and syscall packages. See the Go 1.20.4 milestone on our
issue tracker for details:
https://github.com/golang/go/issues?q=milestone%3AGo1.20.4+label%3ACherryPickApproved
release notes: https://go.dev/doc/devel/release#go1.20.4
full diff: https://github.com/golang/go/compare/go1.20.3...go1.20.4
from the announcement:
> These minor releases include 3 security fixes following the security policy:
>
> - html/template: improper sanitization of CSS values
>
> Angle brackets (`<>`) were not considered dangerous characters when inserted
> into CSS contexts. Templates containing multiple actions separated by a '/'
> character could result in unexpectedly closing the CSS context and allowing
> for injection of unexpected HMTL, if executed with untrusted input.
>
> Thanks to Juho Nurminen of Mattermost for reporting this issue.
>
> This is CVE-2023-24539 and Go issue https://go.dev/issue/59720.
>
> - html/template: improper handling of JavaScript whitespace
>
> Not all valid JavaScript whitespace characters were considered to be
> whitespace. Templates containing whitespace characters outside of the character
> set "\t\n\f\r\u0020\u2028\u2029" in JavaScript contexts that also contain
> actions may not be properly sanitized during execution.
>
> Thanks to Juho Nurminen of Mattermost for reporting this issue.
>
> This is CVE-2023-24540 and Go issue https://go.dev/issue/59721.
>
> - html/template: improper handling of empty HTML attributes
>
> Templates containing actions in unquoted HTML attributes (e.g. "attr={{.}}")
> executed with empty input could result in output that would have unexpected
> results when parsed due to HTML normalization rules. This may allow injection
> of arbitrary attributes into tags.
>
> Thanks to Juho Nurminen of Mattermost for reporting this issue.
>
> This is CVE-2023-29400 and Go issue https://go.dev/issue/59722.
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
(cherry picked from commit b7e8868235)
Signed-off-by: Cory Snider <csnider@mirantis.com>
go1.20.3 (released 2023-04-04) includes security fixes to the go/parser,
html/template, mime/multipart, net/http, and net/textproto packages, as well
as bug fixes to the compiler, the linker, the runtime, and the time package.
See the Go 1.20.3 milestone on our issue tracker for details:
https://github.com/golang/go/issues?q=milestone%3AGo1.20.3+label%3ACherryPickApproved
full diff: https://github.com/golang/go/compare/go1.20.2...go1.20.3
Further details from the announcement on the mailing list:
We have just released Go versions 1.20.3 and 1.19.8, minor point releases.
These minor releases include 4 security fixes following the security policy:
- go/parser: infinite loop in parsing
Calling any of the Parse functions on Go source code which contains `//line`
directives with very large line numbers can cause an infinite loop due to
integer overflow.
Thanks to Philippe Antoine (Catena cyber) for reporting this issue.
This is CVE-2023-24537 and Go issue https://go.dev/issue/59180.
- html/template: backticks not treated as string delimiters
Templates did not properly consider backticks (`) as Javascript string
delimiters, and as such did not escape them as expected. Backticks are
used, since ES6, for JS template literals. If a template contained a Go
template action within a Javascript template literal, the contents of the
action could be used to terminate the literal, injecting arbitrary Javascript
code into the Go template.
As ES6 template literals are rather complex, and themselves can do string
interpolation, we've decided to simply disallow Go template actions from being
used inside of them (e.g. "var a = {{.}}"), since there is no obviously safe
way to allow this behavior. This takes the same approach as
github.com/google/safehtml. Template.Parse will now return an Error when it
encounters templates like this, with a currently unexported ErrorCode with a
value of 12. This ErrorCode will be exported in the next major release.
Users who rely on this behavior can re-enable it using the GODEBUG flag
jstmpllitinterp=1, with the caveat that backticks will now be escaped. This
should be used with caution.
Thanks to Sohom Datta, Manipal Institute of Technology, for reporting this issue.
This is CVE-2023-24538 and Go issue https://go.dev/issue/59234.
- net/http, net/textproto: denial of service from excessive memory allocation
HTTP and MIME header parsing could allocate large amounts of memory, even when
parsing small inputs.
Certain unusual patterns of input data could cause the common function used to
parse HTTP and MIME headers to allocate substantially more memory than
required to hold the parsed headers. An attacker can exploit this behavior to
cause an HTTP server to allocate large amounts of memory from a small request,
potentially leading to memory exhaustion and a denial of service.
Header parsing now correctly allocates only the memory required to hold parsed
headers.
Thanks to Jakob Ackermann (@das7pad) for discovering this issue.
This is CVE-2023-24534 and Go issue https://go.dev/issue/58975.
- net/http, net/textproto, mime/multipart: denial of service from excessive resource consumption
Multipart form parsing can consume large amounts of CPU and memory when
processing form inputs containing very large numbers of parts. This stems from
several causes:
mime/multipart.Reader.ReadForm limits the total memory a parsed multipart form
can consume. ReadForm could undercount the amount of memory consumed, leading
it to accept larger inputs than intended. Limiting total memory does not
account for increased pressure on the garbage collector from large numbers of
small allocations in forms with many parts. ReadForm could allocate a large
number of short-lived buffers, further increasing pressure on the garbage
collector. The combination of these factors can permit an attacker to cause an
program that parses multipart forms to consume large amounts of CPU and
memory, potentially resulting in a denial of service. This affects programs
that use mime/multipart.Reader.ReadForm, as well as form parsing in the
net/http package with the Request methods FormFile, FormValue,
ParseMultipartForm, and PostFormValue.
ReadForm now does a better job of estimating the memory consumption of parsed
forms, and performs many fewer short-lived allocations.
In addition, mime/multipart.Reader now imposes the following limits on the
size of parsed forms:
Forms parsed with ReadForm may contain no more than 1000 parts. This limit may
be adjusted with the environment variable GODEBUG=multipartmaxparts=. Form
parts parsed with NextPart and NextRawPart may contain no more than 10,000
header fields. In addition, forms parsed with ReadForm may contain no more
than 10,000 header fields across all parts. This limit may be adjusted with
the environment variable GODEBUG=multipartmaxheaders=.
Thanks to Jakob Ackermann for discovering this issue.
This is CVE-2023-24536 and Go issue https://go.dev/issue/59153.
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
(cherry picked from commit f6cc8e3512)
Signed-off-by: Cory Snider <csnider@mirantis.com>
Includes a security fix for crypto/elliptic (CVE-2023-24532).
> go1.20.2 (released 2023-03-07) includes a security fix to the crypto/elliptic package,
> as well as bug fixes to the compiler, the covdata command, the linker, the runtime, and
> the crypto/ecdh, crypto/rsa, crypto/x509, os, and syscall packages.
> See the Go 1.20.2 milestone on our issue tracker for details.
https://go.dev/doc/devel/release#go1.20.minor
From the announcement:
> We have just released Go versions 1.20.2 and 1.19.7, minor point releases.
>
> These minor releases include 1 security fixes following the security policy:
>
> - crypto/elliptic: incorrect P-256 ScalarMult and ScalarBaseMult results
>
> The ScalarMult and ScalarBaseMult methods of the P256 Curve may return an
> incorrect result if called with some specific unreduced scalars (a scalar larger
> than the order of the curve).
>
> This does not impact usages of crypto/ecdsa or crypto/ecdh.
>
> This is CVE-2023-24532 and Go issue https://go.dev/issue/58647.
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
(cherry picked from commit 02dec48bab)
Signed-off-by: Cory Snider <csnider@mirantis.com>
We missed a case when parsing extra hosts from the dockerfile
frontend so the build fails.
To handle this case we need to set a dedicated worker label
that contains the host gateway IP so clients like Buildx
can just set the proper host:ip when parsing extra hosts
that contain the special string "host-gateway".
Signed-off-by: CrazyMax <crazy-max@users.noreply.github.com>
(cherry picked from commit 21e50b89c9)
daemon.generateNewName() already reserves the generated name, but its name
did not indicate it did. The daemon.registerName() assumed that the generated
name still had to be reserved, which could mean it would try to reserve the
same name again.
This patch renames daemon.generateNewName to daemon.generateAndReserveName
to make it clearer what it does, and updates registerName() to return early
if it successfully generated (and registered) the container name.
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
(cherry picked from commit 3ba67ee214)
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
Commit 90de570cfa passed through the request
context to daemon.ContainerStop(). As a result, cancelling the context would
cancel the "graceful" stop of the container, and would proceed with forcefully
killing the container.
This patch partially reverts the changes from 90de570cfa
and breaks the context to prevent cancelling the context from cancelling the stop.
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
(cherry picked from commit fc94ed0a86)
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
The official Python images on Docker Hub switched to debian bookworm,
which is now the current stable version of Debian.
However, the location of the apt repository config file changed, which
causes the Dockerfile build to fail;
Loaded image: emptyfs:latest
Loaded image ID: sha256:0df1207206e5288f4a989a2f13d1f5b3c4e70467702c1d5d21dfc9f002b7bd43
INFO: Building docker-sdk-python3:5.0.3...
tests/Dockerfile:6
--------------------
5 | ARG APT_MIRROR
6 | >>> RUN sed -ri "s/(httpredir|deb).debian.org/${APT_MIRROR:-deb.debian.org}/g" /etc/apt/sources.list \
7 | >>> && sed -ri "s/(security).debian.org/${APT_MIRROR:-security.debian.org}/g" /etc/apt/sources.list
8 |
--------------------
ERROR: failed to solve: process "/bin/sh -c sed -ri \"s/(httpredir|deb).debian.org/${APT_MIRROR:-deb.debian.org}/g\" /etc/apt/sources.list && sed -ri \"s/(security).debian.org/${APT_MIRROR:-security.debian.org}/g\" /etc/apt/sources.list" did not complete successfully: exit code: 2
This needs to be fixed in docker-py, but in the meantime, we can pin to
the bullseye variant.
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
(cherry picked from commit 19d860fa9d)
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
go1.19.10 (released 2023-06-06) includes four security fixes to the cmd/go and
runtime packages, as well as bug fixes to the compiler, the go command, and the
runtime. See the Go 1.19.10 milestone on our issue tracker for details:
https://github.com/golang/go/issues?q=milestone%3AGo1.19.10+label%3ACherryPickApproved
full diff: https://github.com/golang/go/compare/go1.19.9...go1.19.10
These minor releases include 3 security fixes following the security policy:
- cmd/go: cgo code injection
The go command may generate unexpected code at build time when using cgo. This
may result in unexpected behavior when running a go program which uses cgo.
This may occur when running an untrusted module which contains directories with
newline characters in their names. Modules which are retrieved using the go command,
i.e. via "go get", are not affected (modules retrieved using GOPATH-mode, i.e.
GO111MODULE=off, may be affected).
Thanks to Juho Nurminen of Mattermost for reporting this issue.
This is CVE-2023-29402 and Go issue https://go.dev/issue/60167.
- runtime: unexpected behavior of setuid/setgid binaries
The Go runtime didn't act any differently when a binary had the setuid/setgid
bit set. On Unix platforms, if a setuid/setgid binary was executed with standard
I/O file descriptors closed, opening any files could result in unexpected
content being read/written with elevated prilieges. Similarly if a setuid/setgid
program was terminated, either via panic or signal, it could leak the contents
of its registers.
Thanks to Vincent Dehors from Synacktiv for reporting this issue.
This is CVE-2023-29403 and Go issue https://go.dev/issue/60272.
- cmd/go: improper sanitization of LDFLAGS
The go command may execute arbitrary code at build time when using cgo. This may
occur when running "go get" on a malicious module, or when running any other
command which builds untrusted code. This is can by triggered by linker flags,
specified via a "#cgo LDFLAGS" directive.
Thanks to Juho Nurminen of Mattermost for reporting this issue.
This is CVE-2023-29404 and CVE-2023-29405 and Go issues https://go.dev/issue/60305 and https://go.dev/issue/60306.
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
While the VXLAN interface and the iptables rules to mark outgoing VXLAN
packets for encryption are configured to use the Swarm data path port,
the XFRM policies for actually applying the encryption are hardcoded to
match packets with destination port 4789/udp. Consequently, encrypted
overlay networks do not pass traffic when the Swarm is configured with
any other data path port: encryption is not applied to the outgoing
VXLAN packets and the destination host drops the received cleartext
packets. Use the configured data path port instead of hardcoding port
4789 in the XFRM policies.
Signed-off-by: Cory Snider <csnider@mirantis.com>
(cherry picked from commit 9a692a3802)
Signed-off-by: Cory Snider <csnider@mirantis.com>
