power-mailinabox/setup/mail-postfix.sh
John R. Supplee fa3c3236d8 v0.43 (September 1, 2019)
-------------------------
 
 Security fixes:
 
 * A security issue was discovered in rsync backups. If you have enabled rsync backups, the file `id_rsa_miab` may have been copied to your backup destination. This file can be used to access your backup destination. If the file was copied to your backup destination, we recommend that you delete the file on your backup destination, delete `/root/.ssh/id_rsa_miab` on your Mail-in-a-Box, then re-run Mail-in-a-Box setup, and re-configure your SSH public key at your backup destination according to the instructions in the Mail-in-a-Box control panel.
 * Brute force attack prevention was missing for the managesieve service.
 
 Setup:
 
 * Nextcloud was not upgraded properly after restoring Mail-in-a-Box from a backup from v0.40 or earlier.
 
 Mail:
 
 * Upgraded Roundcube to 1.3.10.
 * Fetch an updated whitelist for greylisting on a monthly basis to reduce the number of delayed incoming emails.
 
 Control panel:
 
 * When using secondary DNS, it is now possible to specify a subnet range with the `xfr:` option.
 * Fixed an issue when the secondary DNS option is used and the secondary DNS hostname resolves to multiple IP addresses.
 * Fix a bug in how a backup configuration error is shown.
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Merge tag 'v0.43' of https://github.com/mail-in-a-box/mailinabox

v0.43 (September 1, 2019)
-------------------------

Security fixes:

* A security issue was discovered in rsync backups. If you have enabled
rsync backups, the file `id_rsa_miab` may have been copied to your
backup destination. This file can be used to access your backup
destination. If the file was copied to your backup destination, we
recommend that you delete the file on your backup destination, delete
`/root/.ssh/id_rsa_miab` on your Mail-in-a-Box, then re-run
Mail-in-a-Box setup, and re-configure your SSH public key at your backup
destination according to the instructions in the Mail-in-a-Box control
panel.
* Brute force attack prevention was missing for the managesieve service.

Setup:

* Nextcloud was not upgraded properly after restoring Mail-in-a-Box from
a backup from v0.40 or earlier.

Mail:

* Upgraded Roundcube to 1.3.10.
* Fetch an updated whitelist for greylisting on a monthly basis to
reduce the number of delayed incoming emails.

Control panel:

* When using secondary DNS, it is now possible to specify a subnet range
with the `xfr:` option.
* Fixed an issue when the secondary DNS option is used and the secondary
DNS hostname resolves to multiple IP addresses.
* Fix a bug in how a backup configuration error is shown.

5F4C0E7313CCD744693B2AEAB92041F4C10BDD81
2019-09-02 18:33:26 -04:00

300 lines
14 KiB
Bash
Executable file

#!/bin/bash
#
# Postfix (SMTP)
# --------------
#
# Postfix handles the transmission of email between servers
# using the SMTP protocol. It is a Mail Transfer Agent (MTA).
#
# Postfix listens on port 25 (SMTP) for incoming mail from
# other servers on the Internet. It is responsible for very
# basic email filtering such as by IP address and greylisting,
# it checks that the destination address is valid, rewrites
# destinations according to aliases, and passses email on to
# another service for local mail delivery.
#
# The first hop in local mail delivery is to Spamassassin via
# LMTP. Spamassassin then passes mail over to Dovecot for
# storage in the user's mailbox.
#
# Postfix also listens on port 587 (SMTP+STARTLS) for
# connections from users who can authenticate and then sends
# their email out to the outside world. Postfix queries Dovecot
# to authenticate users.
#
# Address validation, alias rewriting, and user authentication
# is configured in a separate setup script mail-users.sh
# because of the overlap of this part with the Dovecot
# configuration.
source setup/functions.sh # load our functions
source /etc/mailinabox.conf # load global vars
# ### Install packages.
# Install postfix's packages.
#
# * `postfix`: The SMTP server.
# * `postfix-pcre`: Enables header filtering.
# * `postgrey`: A mail policy service that soft-rejects mail the first time
# it is received. Spammers don't usually try agian. Legitimate mail
# always will.
# * `ca-certificates`: A trust store used to squelch postfix warnings about
# untrusted opportunistically-encrypted connections.
echo "Installing Postfix (SMTP server)..."
apt_install postfix postfix-sqlite postfix-pcre postgrey ca-certificates \
postfix-policyd-spf-python postsrsd
# ### Basic Settings
# Set some basic settings...
#
# * Have postfix listen on all network interfaces.
# * Make outgoing connections on a particular interface (if multihomed) so that SPF passes on the receiving side.
# * Set our name (the Debian default seems to be "localhost" but make it our hostname).
# * Set the name of the local machine to localhost, which means xxx@localhost is delivered locally, although we don't use it.
# * Set the SMTP banner (which must have the hostname first, then anything).
tools/editconf.py /etc/postfix/main.cf \
inet_interfaces=all \
smtp_bind_address=$PRIVATE_IP \
smtp_bind_address6=$PRIVATE_IPV6 \
myhostname=$PRIMARY_HOSTNAME\
smtpd_banner="\$myhostname ESMTP Hi, I'm a Mail-in-a-Box (Ubuntu/Postfix; see https://mailinabox.email/)" \
mydestination=localhost
# Tweak some queue settings:
# * Inform users when their e-mail delivery is delayed more than 3 hours (default is not to warn).
# * Stop trying to send an undeliverable e-mail after 2 days (instead of 5), and for bounce messages just try for 1 day.
tools/editconf.py /etc/postfix/main.cf \
delay_warning_time=3h \
maximal_queue_lifetime=2d \
bounce_queue_lifetime=1d
# ### Outgoing Mail
# Enable the 'submission' port 587 smtpd server and tweak its settings.
#
# * Enable authentication. It's disabled globally so that it is disabled on port 25,
# so we need to explicitly enable it here.
# * Do not add the OpenDMAC Authentication-Results header. That should only be added
# on incoming mail. Omit the OpenDMARC milter by re-setting smtpd_milters to the
# OpenDKIM milter only. See dkim.sh.
# * Even though we dont allow auth over non-TLS connections (smtpd_tls_auth_only below, and without auth the client cant
# send outbound mail), don't allow non-TLS mail submission on this port anyway to prevent accidental misconfiguration.
# * Require the best ciphers for incoming connections per http://baldric.net/2013/12/07/tls-ciphers-in-postfix-and-dovecot/.
# By putting this setting here we leave opportunistic TLS on incoming mail at default cipher settings (any cipher is better than none).
# * Give it a different name in syslog to distinguish it from the port 25 smtpd server.
# * Add a new cleanup service specific to the submission service ('authclean')
# that filters out privacy-sensitive headers on mail being sent out by
# authenticated users. By default Postfix also applies this to attached
# emails but we turn this off by setting nested_header_checks empty.
tools/editconf.py /etc/postfix/master.cf -s -w \
"submission=inet n - - - - smtpd
-o smtpd_sasl_auth_enable=yes
-o syslog_name=postfix/submission
-o smtpd_milters=inet:127.0.0.1:8891
-o smtpd_tls_security_level=encrypt
-o smtpd_tls_ciphers=high -o smtpd_tls_exclude_ciphers=aNULL,DES,3DES,MD5,DES+MD5,RC4 -o smtpd_tls_mandatory_protocols=!SSLv2,!SSLv3
-o cleanup_service_name=authclean" \
"authclean=unix n - - - 0 cleanup
-o header_checks=pcre:/etc/postfix/outgoing_mail_header_filters
-o nested_header_checks=" \
"policy-spf=unix - n n - - spawn
user=nobody argv=/usr/bin/policyd-spf"
# Install the `outgoing_mail_header_filters` file required by the new 'authclean' service.
cp conf/postfix_outgoing_mail_header_filters /etc/postfix/outgoing_mail_header_filters
# Modify the `outgoing_mail_header_filters` file to use the local machine name and ip
# on the first received header line. This may help reduce the spam score of email by
# removing the 127.0.0.1 reference.
sed -i "s/PRIMARY_HOSTNAME/$PRIMARY_HOSTNAME/" /etc/postfix/outgoing_mail_header_filters
sed -i "s/PUBLIC_IP/$PUBLIC_IP/" /etc/postfix/outgoing_mail_header_filters
# Enable TLS on these and all other connections (i.e. ports 25 *and* 587) and
# require TLS before a user is allowed to authenticate. This also makes
# opportunistic TLS available on *incoming* mail.
# Set stronger DH parameters, which via openssl tend to default to 1024 bits
# (see ssl.sh).
tools/editconf.py /etc/postfix/main.cf \
smtpd_tls_security_level=may\
smtpd_tls_auth_only=yes \
smtpd_tls_cert_file=$STORAGE_ROOT/ssl/ssl_certificate.pem \
smtpd_tls_key_file=$STORAGE_ROOT/ssl/ssl_private_key.pem \
smtpd_tls_dh1024_param_file=$STORAGE_ROOT/ssl/dh2048.pem \
smtpd_tls_protocols=\!SSLv2,\!SSLv3 \
smtpd_tls_ciphers=medium \
smtpd_tls_exclude_ciphers=aNULL,RC4 \
smtpd_tls_received_header=yes
# Prevent non-authenticated users from sending mail that requires being
# relayed elsewhere. We don't want to be an "open relay". On outbound
# mail, require one of:
#
# * `permit_sasl_authenticated`: Authenticated users (i.e. on port 587).
# * `permit_mynetworks`: Mail that originates locally.
# * `reject_unauth_destination`: No one else. (Permits mail whose destination is local and rejects other mail.)
tools/editconf.py /etc/postfix/main.cf \
smtpd_relay_restrictions=permit_sasl_authenticated,permit_mynetworks,reject_unauth_destination
# ### DANE
# When connecting to remote SMTP servers, prefer TLS and use DANE if available.
#
# Prefering ("opportunistic") TLS means Postfix will use TLS if the remote end
# offers it, otherwise it will transmit the message in the clear. Postfix will
# accept whatever SSL certificate the remote end provides. Opportunistic TLS
# protects against passive easvesdropping (but not man-in-the-middle attacks).
# DANE takes this a step further:
#
# Postfix queries DNS for the TLSA record on the destination MX host. If no TLSA records are found,
# then opportunistic TLS is used. Otherwise the server certificate must match the TLSA records
# or else the mail bounces. TLSA also requires DNSSEC on the MX host. Postfix doesn't do DNSSEC
# itself but assumes the system's nameserver does and reports DNSSEC status. Thus this also
# relies on our local DNS server (see system.sh) and `smtp_dns_support_level=dnssec`.
#
# The `smtp_tls_CAfile` is superflous, but it eliminates warnings in the logs about untrusted certs,
# which we don't care about seeing because Postfix is doing opportunistic TLS anyway. Better to encrypt,
# even if we don't know if it's to the right party, than to not encrypt at all. Instead we'll
# now see notices about trusted certs. The CA file is provided by the package `ca-certificates`.
tools/editconf.py /etc/postfix/main.cf \
smtp_tls_protocols=\!SSLv2,\!SSLv3 \
smtp_tls_mandatory_protocols=\!SSLv2,\!SSLv3 \
smtp_tls_ciphers=medium \
smtp_tls_exclude_ciphers=aNULL,RC4 \
smtp_tls_security_level=dane \
smtp_dns_support_level=dnssec \
smtp_tls_CAfile=/etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt \
smtp_tls_loglevel=2
# ### Incoming Mail
# Pass any incoming mail over to a local delivery agent. Spamassassin
# will act as the LDA agent at first. It is listening on port 10025
# with LMTP. Spamassassin will pass the mail over to Dovecot after.
#
# In a basic setup we would pass mail directly to Dovecot by setting
# virtual_transport to `lmtp:unix:private/dovecot-lmtp`.
tools/editconf.py /etc/postfix/main.cf virtual_transport=lmtp:[127.0.0.1]:10025
# Because of a spampd bug, limit the number of recipients in each connection.
# See https://github.com/mail-in-a-box/mailinabox/issues/1523.
tools/editconf.py /etc/postfix/main.cf lmtp_destination_recipient_limit=1
# Who can send mail to us? Some basic filters.
#
# * `reject_non_fqdn_sender`: Reject not-nice-looking return paths.
# * `reject_unknown_sender_domain`: Reject return paths with invalid domains.
# * `reject_authenticated_sender_login_mismatch`: Reject if mail FROM address does not match the client SASL login
# * `reject_rhsbl_sender`: Reject return paths that use blacklisted domains.
# * `permit_sasl_authenticated`: Authenticated users (i.e. on port 587) can skip further checks.
# * `permit_mynetworks`: Mail that originates locally can skip further checks.
# * `reject_rbl_client`: Reject connections from IP addresses blacklisted in zen.spamhaus.org
# * `reject_unlisted_recipient`: Although Postfix will reject mail to unknown recipients, it's nicer to reject such mail ahead of greylisting rather than after.
# * `check_policy_service`: Apply greylisting using postgrey.
#
# Notes: #NODOC
# permit_dnswl_client can pass through mail from whitelisted IP addresses, which would be good to put before greylisting #NODOC
# so these IPs get mail delivered quickly. But when an IP is not listed in the permit_dnswl_client list (i.e. it is not #NODOC
# whitelisted) then postfix does a DEFER_IF_REJECT, which results in all "unknown user" sorts of messages turning into #NODOC
# "450 4.7.1 Client host rejected: Service unavailable". This is a retry code, so the mail doesn't properly bounce. #NODOC
postconf -e smtpd_sender_restrictions="reject_non_fqdn_sender,reject_unknown_sender_domain,reject_authenticated_sender_login_mismatch,reject_rhsbl_sender dbl.spamhaus.org"
RECIPIENT_RESTRICTIONS="permit_sasl_authenticated,permit_mynetworks,reject_rbl_client zen.spamhaus.org,reject_unlisted_recipient"
if [ $POSTGREY == 1 ]; then
RECIPIENT_RESTRICTIONS="${RECIPIENT_RESTRICTIONS},check_policy_service inet:127.0.0.1:10023"
fi
if [ $POLICY_SPF == 1 ]; then
RECIPIENT_RESTRICTIONS="${RECIPIENT_RESTRICTIONS},check_policy_service unix:private/policy-spf"
fi
# Add quota check
RECIPIENT_RESTRICTIONS="${RECIPIENT_RESTRICTIONS},check_policy_service inet:127.0.0.1:12340"
postconf -e smtpd_recipient_restrictions="$RECIPIENT_RESTRICTIONS"
# Postfix connects to Postgrey on the 127.0.0.1 interface specifically. Ensure that
# Postgrey listens on the same interface (and not IPv6, for instance).
# A lot of legit mail servers try to resend before 300 seconds.
# As a matter of fact RFC is not strict about retry timer so postfix and
# other MTA have their own intervals. To fix the problem of receiving
# e-mails really latter, delay of greylisting has been set to
# 180 seconds (default is 300 seconds).
tools/editconf.py /etc/default/postgrey \
POSTGREY_OPTS=\"'--inet=127.0.0.1:10023 --delay=180 --whitelist-recipients=/etc/postgrey/whitelist_clients'\"
# We are going to setup a newer whitelist for postgrey, the version included in the distribution is old
cat > /etc/cron.daily/mailinabox-postgrey-whitelist << EOF;
#!/bin/bash
# Mail-in-a-Box
# check we have a postgrey_whitelist_clients file and that it is not older than 28 days
if [ ! -f /etc/postgrey/whitelist_clients ] || find /etc/postgrey/whitelist_clients -mtime +28 > /dev/null ; then
# ok we need to update the file, so lets try to fetch it
if curl https://postgrey.schweikert.ch/pub/postgrey_whitelist_clients --output /tmp/postgrey_whitelist_clients -sS --fail > /dev/null 2>&1 ; then
# if fetching hasn't failed yet then check it is a plain text file
# curl manual states that --fail sometimes still produces output
# this final check will at least check the output is not html
# before moving it into place
if [ "\$(file -b --mime-type /tmp/postgrey_whitelist_clients)" == "text/plain" ]; then
mv /tmp/postgrey_whitelist_clients /etc/postgrey/whitelist_clients
service postgrey restart
else
rm /tmp/postgrey_whitelist_clients
fi
fi
fi
EOF
chmod +x /etc/cron.daily/mailinabox-postgrey-whitelist
/etc/cron.daily/mailinabox-postgrey-whitelist
# Increase the message size limit from 10MB to 128MB.
# The same limit is specified in nginx.conf for mail submitted via webmail and Z-Push.
tools/editconf.py /etc/postfix/main.cf \
message_size_limit=134217728
if [ $POSTSRSD == 1 ]; then
# Setup SRS
postconf -e \
sender_canonical_maps=tcp:localhost:10001 \
sender_canonical_classes=envelope_sender \
recipient_canonical_maps=tcp:localhost:10002 \
recipient_canonical_classes=envelope_recipient,header_recipient
hide_output systemctl enable postsrsd
hide_output systemctl restart postsrsd
else
postconf -e \
sender_canonical_maps= \
sender_canonical_classes= \
recipient_canonical_maps= \
recipient_canonical_classes=
hide_output systemctl disable postsrsd
hide_output systemctl stop postsrsd
fi
# Allow the two SMTP ports in the firewall.
ufw_allow smtp
ufw_allow submission
# Restart services
restart_service postfix
if [ $POSTGREY == 1 ]; then
hide_output systemctl enable postgrey
hide_output systemctl restart postgrey
else
hide_output systemctl disable postgrey
hide_output systemctl stop postgrey
fi