Justin Cormack 9ed6e39cdd Do not restrict chown via seccomp, just let capabilities control access ... In #22554 I aligned seccomp and capabilities, however the case of the chown calls and CAP_CHOWN was less clearcut, as these are simple calls that the capabilities will block if they are not allowed. They are needed when no new privileges is not set in order to allow docker to call chown before the container is started, so there was a workaround but this did not include all the chown syscalls, and Arm was failing on some seccomp tests because it was using a different syscall from just the fchown that was allowed in this case. It is simpler to just allow all the chown calls in the default seccomp profile and let the capabilities subsystem block them. Signed-off-by: Justin Cormack <justin.cormack@docker.com>		2016-05-25 12:49:30 -07:00
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apparmor	profiles: apparmor: actually calculate version	2016-03-20 19:03:19 +11:00
seccomp	Do not restrict chown via seccomp, just let capabilities control access	2016-05-25 12:49:30 -07:00