moby/daemon/oci_windows.go
Jean Rouge 7fdac7eb0f Making it possible to pass Windows credential specs directly to the engine
Instead of having to go through files or registry values as is currently the
case.

While adding GMSA support to Kubernetes (https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/pull/73726)
I stumbled upon the fact that Docker currently only allows passing Windows
credential specs through files or registry values, forcing the Kubelet
to perform a rather awkward dance of writing-then-deleting to either the
disk or the registry to be able to create a Windows container with cred
specs.

This patch solves this problem by making it possible to directly pass
whole base64-encoded cred specs to the engine's API. I took the opportunity
to slightly refactor the method responsible for Windows cred spec as it
seemed hard to read to me.

Added some unit tests on Windows credential specs handling, as there were
previously none.

Added/amended the relevant integration tests.

I have also tested it manually: given a Windows container using a cred spec
that you would normally start with e.g.
```powershell
docker run --rm --security-opt "credentialspec=file://win.json" mcr.microsoft.com/windows/servercore:ltsc2019 nltest /parentdomain
# output:
# my.ad.domain.com. (1)
# The command completed successfully
```
can now equivalently be started with
```powershell
$rawCredSpec = & cat 'C:\ProgramData\docker\credentialspecs\win.json'
$escaped = $rawCredSpec.Replace('"', '\"')
docker run --rm --security-opt "credentialspec=raw://$escaped" mcr.microsoft.com/windows/servercore:ltsc2019 nltest /parentdomain
# same output!
```

I'll do another PR on Swarmkit after this is merged to allow services to use
the same option.

(It's worth noting that @dperny faced the same problem adding GMSA support
to Swarmkit, to which he came up with an interesting solution - see
https://github.com/moby/moby/pull/38632 - but alas these tricks are not
available to the Kubelet.)

Signed-off-by: Jean Rouge <rougej+github@gmail.com>
2019-03-15 19:20:19 -07:00

493 lines
15 KiB
Go

package daemon // import "github.com/docker/docker/daemon"
import (
"fmt"
"io/ioutil"
"path/filepath"
"runtime"
"strings"
containertypes "github.com/docker/docker/api/types/container"
"github.com/docker/docker/container"
"github.com/docker/docker/errdefs"
"github.com/docker/docker/oci"
"github.com/docker/docker/oci/caps"
"github.com/docker/docker/pkg/sysinfo"
"github.com/docker/docker/pkg/system"
"github.com/opencontainers/runtime-spec/specs-go"
"github.com/pkg/errors"
"golang.org/x/sys/windows"
"golang.org/x/sys/windows/registry"
)
const (
credentialSpecRegistryLocation = `SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Virtualization\Containers\CredentialSpecs`
credentialSpecFileLocation = "CredentialSpecs"
)
func (daemon *Daemon) createSpec(c *container.Container) (*specs.Spec, error) {
img, err := daemon.imageService.GetImage(string(c.ImageID))
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
s := oci.DefaultOSSpec(img.OS)
linkedEnv, err := daemon.setupLinkedContainers(c)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
// Note, unlike Unix, we do NOT call into SetupWorkingDirectory as
// this is done in VMCompute. Further, we couldn't do it for Hyper-V
// containers anyway.
// In base spec
s.Hostname = c.FullHostname()
if err := daemon.setupSecretDir(c); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if err := daemon.setupConfigDir(c); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
// In s.Mounts
mounts, err := daemon.setupMounts(c)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
var isHyperV bool
if c.HostConfig.Isolation.IsDefault() {
// Container using default isolation, so take the default from the daemon configuration
isHyperV = daemon.defaultIsolation.IsHyperV()
} else {
// Container may be requesting an explicit isolation mode.
isHyperV = c.HostConfig.Isolation.IsHyperV()
}
if isHyperV {
s.Windows.HyperV = &specs.WindowsHyperV{}
}
// If the container has not been started, and has configs or secrets
// secrets, create symlinks to each config and secret. If it has been
// started before, the symlinks should have already been created. Also, it
// is important to not mount a Hyper-V container that has been started
// before, to protect the host from the container; for example, from
// malicious mutation of NTFS data structures.
if !c.HasBeenStartedBefore && (len(c.SecretReferences) > 0 || len(c.ConfigReferences) > 0) {
// The container file system is mounted before this function is called,
// except for Hyper-V containers, so mount it here in that case.
if isHyperV {
if err := daemon.Mount(c); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
defer daemon.Unmount(c)
}
if err := c.CreateSecretSymlinks(); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if err := c.CreateConfigSymlinks(); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
}
secretMounts, err := c.SecretMounts()
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if secretMounts != nil {
mounts = append(mounts, secretMounts...)
}
configMounts := c.ConfigMounts()
if configMounts != nil {
mounts = append(mounts, configMounts...)
}
for _, mount := range mounts {
m := specs.Mount{
Source: mount.Source,
Destination: mount.Destination,
}
if !mount.Writable {
m.Options = append(m.Options, "ro")
}
if img.OS != runtime.GOOS {
m.Type = "bind"
m.Options = append(m.Options, "rbind")
m.Options = append(m.Options, fmt.Sprintf("uvmpath=/tmp/gcs/%s/binds", c.ID))
}
s.Mounts = append(s.Mounts, m)
}
// In s.Process
s.Process.Args = append([]string{c.Path}, c.Args...)
if !c.Config.ArgsEscaped && img.OS == "windows" {
s.Process.Args = escapeArgs(s.Process.Args)
}
s.Process.Cwd = c.Config.WorkingDir
s.Process.Env = c.CreateDaemonEnvironment(c.Config.Tty, linkedEnv)
if c.Config.Tty {
s.Process.Terminal = c.Config.Tty
s.Process.ConsoleSize = &specs.Box{
Height: c.HostConfig.ConsoleSize[0],
Width: c.HostConfig.ConsoleSize[1],
}
}
s.Process.User.Username = c.Config.User
s.Windows.LayerFolders, err = daemon.imageService.GetLayerFolders(img, c.RWLayer)
if err != nil {
return nil, errors.Wrapf(err, "container %s", c.ID)
}
dnsSearch := daemon.getDNSSearchSettings(c)
// Get endpoints for the libnetwork allocated networks to the container
var epList []string
AllowUnqualifiedDNSQuery := false
gwHNSID := ""
if c.NetworkSettings != nil {
for n := range c.NetworkSettings.Networks {
sn, err := daemon.FindNetwork(n)
if err != nil {
continue
}
ep, err := getEndpointInNetwork(c.Name, sn)
if err != nil {
continue
}
data, err := ep.DriverInfo()
if err != nil {
continue
}
if data["GW_INFO"] != nil {
gwInfo := data["GW_INFO"].(map[string]interface{})
if gwInfo["hnsid"] != nil {
gwHNSID = gwInfo["hnsid"].(string)
}
}
if data["hnsid"] != nil {
epList = append(epList, data["hnsid"].(string))
}
if data["AllowUnqualifiedDNSQuery"] != nil {
AllowUnqualifiedDNSQuery = true
}
}
}
var networkSharedContainerID string
if c.HostConfig.NetworkMode.IsContainer() {
networkSharedContainerID = c.NetworkSharedContainerID
for _, ep := range c.SharedEndpointList {
epList = append(epList, ep)
}
}
if gwHNSID != "" {
epList = append(epList, gwHNSID)
}
s.Windows.Network = &specs.WindowsNetwork{
AllowUnqualifiedDNSQuery: AllowUnqualifiedDNSQuery,
DNSSearchList: dnsSearch,
EndpointList: epList,
NetworkSharedContainerName: networkSharedContainerID,
}
switch img.OS {
case "windows":
if err := daemon.createSpecWindowsFields(c, &s, isHyperV); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
case "linux":
if !system.LCOWSupported() {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("Linux containers on Windows are not supported")
}
if err := daemon.createSpecLinuxFields(c, &s); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
default:
return nil, fmt.Errorf("Unsupported platform %q", img.OS)
}
return (*specs.Spec)(&s), nil
}
// Sets the Windows-specific fields of the OCI spec
func (daemon *Daemon) createSpecWindowsFields(c *container.Container, s *specs.Spec, isHyperV bool) error {
if len(s.Process.Cwd) == 0 {
// We default to C:\ to workaround the oddity of the case that the
// default directory for cmd running as LocalSystem (or
// ContainerAdministrator) is c:\windows\system32. Hence docker run
// <image> cmd will by default end in c:\windows\system32, rather
// than 'root' (/) on Linux. The oddity is that if you have a dockerfile
// which has no WORKDIR and has a COPY file ., . will be interpreted
// as c:\. Hence, setting it to default of c:\ makes for consistency.
s.Process.Cwd = `C:\`
}
s.Root.Readonly = false // Windows does not support a read-only root filesystem
if !isHyperV {
if c.BaseFS == nil {
return errors.New("createSpecWindowsFields: BaseFS of container " + c.ID + " is unexpectedly nil")
}
s.Root.Path = c.BaseFS.Path() // This is not set for Hyper-V containers
if !strings.HasSuffix(s.Root.Path, `\`) {
s.Root.Path = s.Root.Path + `\` // Ensure a correctly formatted volume GUID path \\?\Volume{GUID}\
}
}
// First boot optimization
s.Windows.IgnoreFlushesDuringBoot = !c.HasBeenStartedBefore
setResourcesInSpec(c, s, isHyperV)
// Read and add credentials from the security options if a credential spec has been provided.
if err := daemon.setWindowsCredentialSpec(c, s); err != nil {
return err
}
// Do we have any assigned devices?
if len(c.HostConfig.Devices) > 0 {
if isHyperV {
return errors.New("device assignment is not supported for HyperV containers")
}
if system.GetOSVersion().Build < 17763 {
return errors.New("device assignment requires Windows builds RS5 (17763+) or later")
}
for _, deviceMapping := range c.HostConfig.Devices {
srcParts := strings.SplitN(deviceMapping.PathOnHost, "/", 2)
if len(srcParts) != 2 {
return errors.New("invalid device assignment path")
}
if srcParts[0] != "class" {
return errors.Errorf("invalid device assignment type: '%s' should be 'class'", srcParts[0])
}
wd := specs.WindowsDevice{
ID: srcParts[1],
IDType: srcParts[0],
}
s.Windows.Devices = append(s.Windows.Devices, wd)
}
}
return nil
}
var errInvalidCredentialSpecSecOpt = errdefs.InvalidParameter(fmt.Errorf("invalid credential spec security option - value must be prefixed by 'file://', 'registry://', or 'raw://' followed by a non-empty value"))
// setWindowsCredentialSpec sets the spec's `Windows.CredentialSpec`
// field if relevant
func (daemon *Daemon) setWindowsCredentialSpec(c *container.Container, s *specs.Spec) error {
if c.HostConfig == nil || c.HostConfig.SecurityOpt == nil {
return nil
}
// TODO (jrouge/wk8): if provided with several security options, we silently ignore
// all but the last one (provided they're all valid, otherwise we do return an error);
// this doesn't seem like a great idea?
credentialSpec := ""
for _, secOpt := range c.HostConfig.SecurityOpt {
optSplits := strings.SplitN(secOpt, "=", 2)
if len(optSplits) != 2 {
return errdefs.InvalidParameter(fmt.Errorf("invalid security option: no equals sign in supplied value %s", secOpt))
}
if !strings.EqualFold(optSplits[0], "credentialspec") {
return errdefs.InvalidParameter(fmt.Errorf("security option not supported: %s", optSplits[0]))
}
credSpecSplits := strings.SplitN(optSplits[1], "://", 2)
if len(credSpecSplits) != 2 || credSpecSplits[1] == "" {
return errInvalidCredentialSpecSecOpt
}
value := credSpecSplits[1]
var err error
switch strings.ToLower(credSpecSplits[0]) {
case "file":
if credentialSpec, err = readCredentialSpecFile(c.ID, daemon.root, filepath.Clean(value)); err != nil {
return errdefs.InvalidParameter(err)
}
case "registry":
if credentialSpec, err = readCredentialSpecRegistry(c.ID, value); err != nil {
return errdefs.InvalidParameter(err)
}
case "config":
// if the container does not have a DependencyStore, then it
// isn't swarmkit managed. In order to avoid creating any
// impression that `config://` is a valid API, return the same
// error as if you'd passed any other random word.
if c.DependencyStore == nil {
return errInvalidCredentialSpecSecOpt
}
csConfig, err := c.DependencyStore.Configs().Get(value)
if err != nil {
return errdefs.System(errors.Wrap(err, "error getting value from config store"))
}
// stuff the resulting secret data into a string to use as the
// CredentialSpec
credentialSpec = string(csConfig.Spec.Data)
case "raw":
credentialSpec = value
default:
return errInvalidCredentialSpecSecOpt
}
}
if credentialSpec != "" {
if s.Windows == nil {
s.Windows = &specs.Windows{}
}
s.Windows.CredentialSpec = credentialSpec
}
return nil
}
// Sets the Linux-specific fields of the OCI spec
// TODO: @jhowardmsft LCOW Support. We need to do a lot more pulling in what can
// be pulled in from oci_linux.go.
func (daemon *Daemon) createSpecLinuxFields(c *container.Container, s *specs.Spec) error {
if len(s.Process.Cwd) == 0 {
s.Process.Cwd = `/`
}
s.Root.Path = "rootfs"
s.Root.Readonly = c.HostConfig.ReadonlyRootfs
setResourcesInSpec(c, s, true) // LCOW is Hyper-V only
capabilities, err := caps.TweakCapabilities(oci.DefaultCapabilities(), c.HostConfig.CapAdd, c.HostConfig.CapDrop, c.HostConfig.Capabilities, c.HostConfig.Privileged)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("linux spec capabilities: %v", err)
}
if err := oci.SetCapabilities(s, capabilities); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("linux spec capabilities: %v", err)
}
devPermissions, err := oci.AppendDevicePermissionsFromCgroupRules(nil, c.HostConfig.DeviceCgroupRules)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("linux runtime spec devices: %v", err)
}
s.Linux.Resources.Devices = devPermissions
return nil
}
func setResourcesInSpec(c *container.Container, s *specs.Spec, isHyperV bool) {
// In s.Windows.Resources
cpuShares := uint16(c.HostConfig.CPUShares)
cpuMaximum := uint16(c.HostConfig.CPUPercent) * 100
cpuCount := uint64(c.HostConfig.CPUCount)
if c.HostConfig.NanoCPUs > 0 {
if isHyperV {
cpuCount = uint64(c.HostConfig.NanoCPUs / 1e9)
leftoverNanoCPUs := c.HostConfig.NanoCPUs % 1e9
if leftoverNanoCPUs != 0 {
cpuCount++
cpuMaximum = uint16(c.HostConfig.NanoCPUs / int64(cpuCount) / (1e9 / 10000))
if cpuMaximum < 1 {
// The requested NanoCPUs is so small that we rounded to 0, use 1 instead
cpuMaximum = 1
}
}
} else {
cpuMaximum = uint16(c.HostConfig.NanoCPUs / int64(sysinfo.NumCPU()) / (1e9 / 10000))
if cpuMaximum < 1 {
// The requested NanoCPUs is so small that we rounded to 0, use 1 instead
cpuMaximum = 1
}
}
}
memoryLimit := uint64(c.HostConfig.Memory)
s.Windows.Resources = &specs.WindowsResources{
CPU: &specs.WindowsCPUResources{
Maximum: &cpuMaximum,
Shares: &cpuShares,
Count: &cpuCount,
},
Memory: &specs.WindowsMemoryResources{
Limit: &memoryLimit,
},
Storage: &specs.WindowsStorageResources{
Bps: &c.HostConfig.IOMaximumBandwidth,
Iops: &c.HostConfig.IOMaximumIOps,
},
}
}
func escapeArgs(args []string) []string {
escapedArgs := make([]string, len(args))
for i, a := range args {
escapedArgs[i] = windows.EscapeArg(a)
}
return escapedArgs
}
// mergeUlimits merge the Ulimits from HostConfig with daemon defaults, and update HostConfig
// It will do nothing on non-Linux platform
func (daemon *Daemon) mergeUlimits(c *containertypes.HostConfig) {
return
}
// registryKey is an interface wrapper around `registry.Key`,
// listing only the methods we care about here.
// It's mainly useful to easily allow mocking the registry in tests.
type registryKey interface {
GetStringValue(name string) (val string, valtype uint32, err error)
Close() error
}
var registryOpenKeyFunc = func(baseKey registry.Key, path string, access uint32) (registryKey, error) {
return registry.OpenKey(baseKey, path, access)
}
// readCredentialSpecRegistry is a helper function to read a credential spec from
// the registry. If not found, we return an empty string and warn in the log.
// This allows for staging on machines which do not have the necessary components.
func readCredentialSpecRegistry(id, name string) (string, error) {
key, err := registryOpenKeyFunc(registry.LOCAL_MACHINE, credentialSpecRegistryLocation, registry.QUERY_VALUE)
if err != nil {
return "", errors.Wrapf(err, "failed handling spec %q for container %s - registry key %s could not be opened", name, id, credentialSpecRegistryLocation)
}
defer key.Close()
value, _, err := key.GetStringValue(name)
if err != nil {
if err == registry.ErrNotExist {
return "", fmt.Errorf("registry credential spec %q for container %s was not found", name, id)
}
return "", errors.Wrapf(err, "error reading credential spec %q from registry for container %s", name, id)
}
return value, nil
}
// readCredentialSpecFile is a helper function to read a credential spec from
// a file. If not found, we return an empty string and warn in the log.
// This allows for staging on machines which do not have the necessary components.
func readCredentialSpecFile(id, root, location string) (string, error) {
if filepath.IsAbs(location) {
return "", fmt.Errorf("invalid credential spec - file:// path cannot be absolute")
}
base := filepath.Join(root, credentialSpecFileLocation)
full := filepath.Join(base, location)
if !strings.HasPrefix(full, base) {
return "", fmt.Errorf("invalid credential spec - file:// path must be under %s", base)
}
bcontents, err := ioutil.ReadFile(full)
if err != nil {
return "", errors.Wrapf(err, "credential spec for container %s could not be read from file %q", id, full)
}
return string(bcontents[:]), nil
}