moby/profiles/seccomp
Albin Kerouanton 891241e7e7
seccomp: block io_uring_* syscalls in default profile
This syncs the seccomp profile with changes made to containerd's default
profile in [1].

The original containerd issue and PR mention:

> Security experts generally believe io_uring to be unsafe. In fact
> Google ChromeOS and Android have turned it off, plus all Google
> production servers turn it off. Based on the blog published by Google
> below it seems like a bunch of vulnerabilities related to io_uring can
> be exploited to breakout of the container.
>
> [2]
>
> Other security reaserchers also hold this opinion: see [3] for a
> blackhat presentation on io_uring exploits.

For the record, these syscalls were added to the allowlist in [4].

[1]: a48ddf4a20
[2]: https://security.googleblog.com/2023/06/learnings-from-kctf-vrps-42-linux.html
[3]: https://i.blackhat.com/BH-US-23/Presentations/US-23-Lin-bad_io_uring.pdf
[4]: https://github.com/moby/moby/pull/39415

Signed-off-by: Albin Kerouanton <albinker@gmail.com>
2023-11-02 19:05:47 +01:00
..
fixtures seccomp: Use explicit DefaultErrnoRet 2021-07-30 19:13:21 +02:00
default.json seccomp: block io_uring_* syscalls in default profile 2023-11-02 19:05:47 +01:00
default_linux.go seccomp: block io_uring_* syscalls in default profile 2023-11-02 19:05:47 +01:00
generate.go profiles/seccomp: format code with gofumpt 2023-06-29 00:31:50 +02:00
kernel_linux.go profiles/seccomp: format code with gofumpt 2023-06-29 00:31:50 +02:00
kernel_linux_test.go seccomp: implement marshal/unmarshall for MinVersion 2020-10-07 17:48:25 +02:00
seccomp.go seccomp: Seccomp: embed oci-spec LinuxSeccomp, add support for seccomp flags 2021-07-17 15:57:54 +02:00
seccomp_linux.go seccomp: Seccomp: embed oci-spec LinuxSeccomp, add support for seccomp flags 2021-07-17 15:57:54 +02:00
seccomp_test.go profiles/seccomp: format code with gofumpt 2023-06-29 00:31:50 +02:00