moby/daemon/oci_windows.go
John Howard 20833b06a0 Windows: (WCOW) Generate OCI spec that remote runtime can escape
Signed-off-by: John Howard <jhoward@microsoft.com>

Also fixes https://github.com/moby/moby/issues/22874

This commit is a pre-requisite to moving moby/moby on Windows to using
Containerd for its runtime.

The reason for this is that the interface between moby and containerd
for the runtime is an OCI spec which must be unambigious.

It is the responsibility of the runtime (runhcs in the case of
containerd on Windows) to ensure that arguments are escaped prior
to calling into HCS and onwards to the Win32 CreateProcess call.

Previously, the builder was always escaping arguments which has
led to several bugs in moby. Because the local runtime in
libcontainerd had context of whether or not arguments were escaped,
it was possible to hack around in daemon/oci_windows.go with
knowledge of the context of the call (from builder or not).

With a remote runtime, this is not possible as there's rightly
no context of the caller passed across in the OCI spec. Put another
way, as I put above, the OCI spec must be unambigious.

The other previous limitation (which leads to various subtle bugs)
is that moby is coded entirely from a Linux-centric point of view.

Unfortunately, Windows != Linux. Windows CreateProcess uses a
command line, not an array of arguments. And it has very specific
rules about how to escape a command line. Some interesting reading
links about this are:

https://blogs.msdn.microsoft.com/twistylittlepassagesallalike/2011/04/23/everyone-quotes-command-line-arguments-the-wrong-way/
https://stackoverflow.com/questions/31838469/how-do-i-convert-argv-to-lpcommandline-parameter-of-createprocess
https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/cpp/cpp/parsing-cpp-command-line-arguments?view=vs-2017

For this reason, the OCI spec has recently been updated to cater
for more natural syntax by including a CommandLine option in
Process.

What does this commit do?

Primary objective is to ensure that the built OCI spec is unambigious.

It changes the builder so that `ArgsEscaped` as commited in a
layer is only controlled by the use of CMD or ENTRYPOINT.

Subsequently, when calling in to create a container from the builder,
if follows a different path to both `docker run` and `docker create`
using the added `ContainerCreateIgnoreImagesArgsEscaped`. This allows
a RUN from the builder to control how to escape in the OCI spec.

It changes the builder so that when shell form is used for RUN,
CMD or ENTRYPOINT, it builds (for WCOW) a more natural command line
using the original as put by the user in the dockerfile, not
the parsed version as a set of args which loses fidelity.
This command line is put into args[0] and `ArgsEscaped` is set
to true for CMD or ENTRYPOINT. A RUN statement does not commit
`ArgsEscaped` to the commited layer regardless or whether shell
or exec form were used.
2019-03-12 18:41:55 -07:00

498 lines
16 KiB
Go

package daemon // import "github.com/docker/docker/daemon"
import (
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"io/ioutil"
"path/filepath"
"runtime"
"strings"
containertypes "github.com/docker/docker/api/types/container"
"github.com/docker/docker/container"
"github.com/docker/docker/oci"
"github.com/docker/docker/oci/caps"
"github.com/docker/docker/pkg/sysinfo"
"github.com/docker/docker/pkg/system"
"github.com/opencontainers/runtime-spec/specs-go"
"github.com/pkg/errors"
"github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
"golang.org/x/sys/windows/registry"
)
const (
credentialSpecRegistryLocation = `SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Virtualization\Containers\CredentialSpecs`
credentialSpecFileLocation = "CredentialSpecs"
)
func (daemon *Daemon) createSpec(c *container.Container) (*specs.Spec, error) {
img, err := daemon.imageService.GetImage(string(c.ImageID))
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
s := oci.DefaultOSSpec(img.OS)
linkedEnv, err := daemon.setupLinkedContainers(c)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
// Note, unlike Unix, we do NOT call into SetupWorkingDirectory as
// this is done in VMCompute. Further, we couldn't do it for Hyper-V
// containers anyway.
// In base spec
s.Hostname = c.FullHostname()
if err := daemon.setupSecretDir(c); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if err := daemon.setupConfigDir(c); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
// In s.Mounts
mounts, err := daemon.setupMounts(c)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
var isHyperV bool
if c.HostConfig.Isolation.IsDefault() {
// Container using default isolation, so take the default from the daemon configuration
isHyperV = daemon.defaultIsolation.IsHyperV()
} else {
// Container may be requesting an explicit isolation mode.
isHyperV = c.HostConfig.Isolation.IsHyperV()
}
if isHyperV {
s.Windows.HyperV = &specs.WindowsHyperV{}
}
// If the container has not been started, and has configs or secrets
// secrets, create symlinks to each config and secret. If it has been
// started before, the symlinks should have already been created. Also, it
// is important to not mount a Hyper-V container that has been started
// before, to protect the host from the container; for example, from
// malicious mutation of NTFS data structures.
if !c.HasBeenStartedBefore && (len(c.SecretReferences) > 0 || len(c.ConfigReferences) > 0) {
// The container file system is mounted before this function is called,
// except for Hyper-V containers, so mount it here in that case.
if isHyperV {
if err := daemon.Mount(c); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
defer daemon.Unmount(c)
}
if err := c.CreateSecretSymlinks(); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if err := c.CreateConfigSymlinks(); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
}
secretMounts, err := c.SecretMounts()
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if secretMounts != nil {
mounts = append(mounts, secretMounts...)
}
configMounts := c.ConfigMounts()
if configMounts != nil {
mounts = append(mounts, configMounts...)
}
for _, mount := range mounts {
m := specs.Mount{
Source: mount.Source,
Destination: mount.Destination,
}
if !mount.Writable {
m.Options = append(m.Options, "ro")
}
if img.OS != runtime.GOOS {
m.Type = "bind"
m.Options = append(m.Options, "rbind")
m.Options = append(m.Options, fmt.Sprintf("uvmpath=/tmp/gcs/%s/binds", c.ID))
}
s.Mounts = append(s.Mounts, m)
}
// In s.Process
s.Process.Cwd = c.Config.WorkingDir
s.Process.Env = c.CreateDaemonEnvironment(c.Config.Tty, linkedEnv)
if c.Config.Tty {
s.Process.Terminal = c.Config.Tty
s.Process.ConsoleSize = &specs.Box{
Height: c.HostConfig.ConsoleSize[0],
Width: c.HostConfig.ConsoleSize[1],
}
}
s.Process.User.Username = c.Config.User
s.Windows.LayerFolders, err = daemon.imageService.GetLayerFolders(img, c.RWLayer)
if err != nil {
return nil, errors.Wrapf(err, "container %s", c.ID)
}
dnsSearch := daemon.getDNSSearchSettings(c)
// Get endpoints for the libnetwork allocated networks to the container
var epList []string
AllowUnqualifiedDNSQuery := false
gwHNSID := ""
if c.NetworkSettings != nil {
for n := range c.NetworkSettings.Networks {
sn, err := daemon.FindNetwork(n)
if err != nil {
continue
}
ep, err := getEndpointInNetwork(c.Name, sn)
if err != nil {
continue
}
data, err := ep.DriverInfo()
if err != nil {
continue
}
if data["GW_INFO"] != nil {
gwInfo := data["GW_INFO"].(map[string]interface{})
if gwInfo["hnsid"] != nil {
gwHNSID = gwInfo["hnsid"].(string)
}
}
if data["hnsid"] != nil {
epList = append(epList, data["hnsid"].(string))
}
if data["AllowUnqualifiedDNSQuery"] != nil {
AllowUnqualifiedDNSQuery = true
}
}
}
var networkSharedContainerID string
if c.HostConfig.NetworkMode.IsContainer() {
networkSharedContainerID = c.NetworkSharedContainerID
for _, ep := range c.SharedEndpointList {
epList = append(epList, ep)
}
}
if gwHNSID != "" {
epList = append(epList, gwHNSID)
}
s.Windows.Network = &specs.WindowsNetwork{
AllowUnqualifiedDNSQuery: AllowUnqualifiedDNSQuery,
DNSSearchList: dnsSearch,
EndpointList: epList,
NetworkSharedContainerName: networkSharedContainerID,
}
switch img.OS {
case "windows":
if err := daemon.createSpecWindowsFields(c, &s, isHyperV); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
case "linux":
if !system.LCOWSupported() {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("Linux containers on Windows are not supported")
}
if err := daemon.createSpecLinuxFields(c, &s); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
default:
return nil, fmt.Errorf("Unsupported platform %q", img.OS)
}
if logrus.IsLevelEnabled(logrus.DebugLevel) {
if b, err := json.Marshal(&s); err == nil {
logrus.Debugf("Generated spec: %s", string(b))
}
}
return (*specs.Spec)(&s), nil
}
// Sets the Windows-specific fields of the OCI spec
func (daemon *Daemon) createSpecWindowsFields(c *container.Container, s *specs.Spec, isHyperV bool) error {
if len(s.Process.Cwd) == 0 {
// We default to C:\ to workaround the oddity of the case that the
// default directory for cmd running as LocalSystem (or
// ContainerAdministrator) is c:\windows\system32. Hence docker run
// <image> cmd will by default end in c:\windows\system32, rather
// than 'root' (/) on Linux. The oddity is that if you have a dockerfile
// which has no WORKDIR and has a COPY file ., . will be interpreted
// as c:\. Hence, setting it to default of c:\ makes for consistency.
s.Process.Cwd = `C:\`
}
if c.Config.ArgsEscaped {
s.Process.CommandLine = c.Path
if len(c.Args) > 0 {
s.Process.CommandLine += " " + system.EscapeArgs(c.Args)
}
} else {
s.Process.Args = append([]string{c.Path}, c.Args...)
}
s.Root.Readonly = false // Windows does not support a read-only root filesystem
if !isHyperV {
if c.BaseFS == nil {
return errors.New("createSpecWindowsFields: BaseFS of container " + c.ID + " is unexpectedly nil")
}
s.Root.Path = c.BaseFS.Path() // This is not set for Hyper-V containers
if !strings.HasSuffix(s.Root.Path, `\`) {
s.Root.Path = s.Root.Path + `\` // Ensure a correctly formatted volume GUID path \\?\Volume{GUID}\
}
}
// First boot optimization
s.Windows.IgnoreFlushesDuringBoot = !c.HasBeenStartedBefore
setResourcesInSpec(c, s, isHyperV)
// Read and add credentials from the security options if a credential spec has been provided.
if c.HostConfig.SecurityOpt != nil {
cs := ""
for _, sOpt := range c.HostConfig.SecurityOpt {
sOpt = strings.ToLower(sOpt)
if !strings.Contains(sOpt, "=") {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid security option: no equals sign in supplied value %s", sOpt)
}
var splitsOpt []string
splitsOpt = strings.SplitN(sOpt, "=", 2)
if len(splitsOpt) != 2 {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid security option: %s", sOpt)
}
if splitsOpt[0] != "credentialspec" {
return fmt.Errorf("security option not supported: %s", splitsOpt[0])
}
var (
match bool
csValue string
err error
)
if match, csValue = getCredentialSpec("file://", splitsOpt[1]); match {
if csValue == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("no value supplied for file:// credential spec security option")
}
if cs, err = readCredentialSpecFile(c.ID, daemon.root, filepath.Clean(csValue)); err != nil {
return err
}
} else if match, csValue = getCredentialSpec("registry://", splitsOpt[1]); match {
if csValue == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("no value supplied for registry:// credential spec security option")
}
if cs, err = readCredentialSpecRegistry(c.ID, csValue); err != nil {
return err
}
} else if match, csValue = getCredentialSpec("config://", splitsOpt[1]); match {
// if the container does not have a DependencyStore, then it
// isn't swarmkit managed. In order to avoid creating any
// impression that `config://` is a valid API, return the same
// error as if you'd passed any other random word.
if c.DependencyStore == nil {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid credential spec security option - value must be prefixed file:// or registry:// followed by a value")
}
// after this point, we can return regular swarmkit-relevant
// errors, because we'll know this container is managed.
if csValue == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("no value supplied for config:// credential spec security option")
}
csConfig, err := c.DependencyStore.Configs().Get(csValue)
if err != nil {
return errors.Wrap(err, "error getting value from config store")
}
// stuff the resulting secret data into a string to use as the
// CredentialSpec
cs = string(csConfig.Spec.Data)
} else {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid credential spec security option - value must be prefixed file:// or registry:// followed by a value")
}
}
s.Windows.CredentialSpec = cs
}
// Do we have any assigned devices?
if len(c.HostConfig.Devices) > 0 {
if isHyperV {
return errors.New("device assignment is not supported for HyperV containers")
}
if system.GetOSVersion().Build < 17763 {
return errors.New("device assignment requires Windows builds RS5 (17763+) or later")
}
for _, deviceMapping := range c.HostConfig.Devices {
srcParts := strings.SplitN(deviceMapping.PathOnHost, "/", 2)
if len(srcParts) != 2 {
return errors.New("invalid device assignment path")
}
if srcParts[0] != "class" {
return errors.Errorf("invalid device assignment type: '%s' should be 'class'", srcParts[0])
}
wd := specs.WindowsDevice{
ID: srcParts[1],
IDType: srcParts[0],
}
s.Windows.Devices = append(s.Windows.Devices, wd)
}
}
return nil
}
// Sets the Linux-specific fields of the OCI spec
// TODO: @jhowardmsft LCOW Support. We need to do a lot more pulling in what can
// be pulled in from oci_linux.go.
func (daemon *Daemon) createSpecLinuxFields(c *container.Container, s *specs.Spec) error {
if len(s.Process.Cwd) == 0 {
s.Process.Cwd = `/`
}
s.Process.Args = append([]string{c.Path}, c.Args...)
s.Root.Path = "rootfs"
s.Root.Readonly = c.HostConfig.ReadonlyRootfs
setResourcesInSpec(c, s, true) // LCOW is Hyper-V only
capabilities, err := caps.TweakCapabilities(oci.DefaultCapabilities(), c.HostConfig.CapAdd, c.HostConfig.CapDrop, c.HostConfig.Capabilities, c.HostConfig.Privileged)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("linux spec capabilities: %v", err)
}
if err := oci.SetCapabilities(s, capabilities); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("linux spec capabilities: %v", err)
}
devPermissions, err := oci.AppendDevicePermissionsFromCgroupRules(nil, c.HostConfig.DeviceCgroupRules)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("linux runtime spec devices: %v", err)
}
s.Linux.Resources.Devices = devPermissions
return nil
}
func setResourcesInSpec(c *container.Container, s *specs.Spec, isHyperV bool) {
// In s.Windows.Resources
cpuShares := uint16(c.HostConfig.CPUShares)
cpuMaximum := uint16(c.HostConfig.CPUPercent) * 100
cpuCount := uint64(c.HostConfig.CPUCount)
if c.HostConfig.NanoCPUs > 0 {
if isHyperV {
cpuCount = uint64(c.HostConfig.NanoCPUs / 1e9)
leftoverNanoCPUs := c.HostConfig.NanoCPUs % 1e9
if leftoverNanoCPUs != 0 {
cpuCount++
cpuMaximum = uint16(c.HostConfig.NanoCPUs / int64(cpuCount) / (1e9 / 10000))
if cpuMaximum < 1 {
// The requested NanoCPUs is so small that we rounded to 0, use 1 instead
cpuMaximum = 1
}
}
} else {
cpuMaximum = uint16(c.HostConfig.NanoCPUs / int64(sysinfo.NumCPU()) / (1e9 / 10000))
if cpuMaximum < 1 {
// The requested NanoCPUs is so small that we rounded to 0, use 1 instead
cpuMaximum = 1
}
}
}
if cpuMaximum != 0 || cpuShares != 0 || cpuCount != 0 {
if s.Windows.Resources == nil {
s.Windows.Resources = &specs.WindowsResources{}
}
s.Windows.Resources.CPU = &specs.WindowsCPUResources{
Maximum: &cpuMaximum,
Shares: &cpuShares,
Count: &cpuCount,
}
}
memoryLimit := uint64(c.HostConfig.Memory)
if memoryLimit != 0 {
if s.Windows.Resources == nil {
s.Windows.Resources = &specs.WindowsResources{}
}
s.Windows.Resources.Memory = &specs.WindowsMemoryResources{
Limit: &memoryLimit,
}
}
if c.HostConfig.IOMaximumBandwidth != 0 || c.HostConfig.IOMaximumIOps != 0 {
if s.Windows.Resources == nil {
s.Windows.Resources = &specs.WindowsResources{}
}
s.Windows.Resources.Storage = &specs.WindowsStorageResources{
Bps: &c.HostConfig.IOMaximumBandwidth,
Iops: &c.HostConfig.IOMaximumIOps,
}
}
}
// mergeUlimits merge the Ulimits from HostConfig with daemon defaults, and update HostConfig
// It will do nothing on non-Linux platform
func (daemon *Daemon) mergeUlimits(c *containertypes.HostConfig) {
return
}
// getCredentialSpec is a helper function to get the value of a credential spec supplied
// on the CLI, stripping the prefix
func getCredentialSpec(prefix, value string) (bool, string) {
if strings.HasPrefix(value, prefix) {
return true, strings.TrimPrefix(value, prefix)
}
return false, ""
}
// readCredentialSpecRegistry is a helper function to read a credential spec from
// the registry. If not found, we return an empty string and warn in the log.
// This allows for staging on machines which do not have the necessary components.
func readCredentialSpecRegistry(id, name string) (string, error) {
var (
k registry.Key
err error
val string
)
if k, err = registry.OpenKey(registry.LOCAL_MACHINE, credentialSpecRegistryLocation, registry.QUERY_VALUE); err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("failed handling spec %q for container %s - %s could not be opened", name, id, credentialSpecRegistryLocation)
}
if val, _, err = k.GetStringValue(name); err != nil {
if err == registry.ErrNotExist {
return "", fmt.Errorf("credential spec %q for container %s as it was not found", name, id)
}
return "", fmt.Errorf("error %v reading credential spec %q from registry for container %s", err, name, id)
}
return val, nil
}
// readCredentialSpecFile is a helper function to read a credential spec from
// a file. If not found, we return an empty string and warn in the log.
// This allows for staging on machines which do not have the necessary components.
func readCredentialSpecFile(id, root, location string) (string, error) {
if filepath.IsAbs(location) {
return "", fmt.Errorf("invalid credential spec - file:// path cannot be absolute")
}
base := filepath.Join(root, credentialSpecFileLocation)
full := filepath.Join(base, location)
if !strings.HasPrefix(full, base) {
return "", fmt.Errorf("invalid credential spec - file:// path must be under %s", base)
}
bcontents, err := ioutil.ReadFile(full)
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("credential spec '%s' for container %s as the file could not be read: %q", full, id, err)
}
return string(bcontents[:]), nil
}