release notes: https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/releases/tag/v1.1.5
diff: https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/compare/v1.1.4...v1.1.5
This is the fifth patch release in the 1.1.z series of runc, which fixes
three CVEs found in runc.
* CVE-2023-25809 is a vulnerability involving rootless containers where
(under specific configurations), the container would have write access
to the /sys/fs/cgroup/user.slice/... cgroup hierarchy. No other
hierarchies on the host were affected. This vulnerability was
discovered by Akihiro Suda.
<https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/security/advisories/GHSA-m8cg-xc2p-r3fc>
* CVE-2023-27561 was a regression which effectively re-introduced
CVE-2019-19921. This bug was present from v1.0.0-rc95 to v1.1.4. This
regression was discovered by @Beuc.
<https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-vpvm-3wq2-2wvm>
* CVE-2023-28642 is a variant of CVE-2023-27561 and was fixed by the same
patch. This variant of the above vulnerability was reported by Lei
Wang.
<https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/security/advisories/GHSA-g2j6-57v7-gm8c>
In addition, the following other fixes are included in this release:
* Fix the inability to use `/dev/null` when inside a container.
* Fix changing the ownership of host's `/dev/null` caused by fd redirection
(a regression in 1.1.1).
* Fix rare runc exec/enter unshare error on older kernels, including
CentOS < 7.7.
* nsexec: Check for errors in `write_log()`.
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
(cherry picked from commit 77be7b777c)
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
Signed-off-by: Paweł Gronowski <pawel.gronowski@docker.com>
(cherry picked from commit be34e93f20)
Signed-off-by: Paweł Gronowski <pawel.gronowski@docker.com>
FirewallD creates the root INPUT chain with a default-accept policy and
a terminal rule which rejects all packets not accepted by any prior
rule. Any subsequent rules appended to the chain are therefore inert.
The administrator would have to open the VXLAN UDP port to make overlay
networks work at all, which would result in all VXLAN traffic being
accepted and defeating our attempts to enforce encryption on encrypted
overlay networks.
Insert the rule to drop unencrypted VXLAN packets tagged for encrypted
overlay networks at the top of the INPUT chain so that enforcement of
mandatory encryption takes precedence over any accept rules configured
by the administrator. Continue to append the accept rule to the bottom
of the chain so as not to override any administrator-configured drop
rules.
Signed-off-by: Cory Snider <csnider@mirantis.com>
(cherry picked from commit 965eda3b9a)
Signed-off-by: Cory Snider <csnider@mirantis.com>
Use `exec.Command` created by this function instead of obtaining it from
daemon struct. This prevents a race condition where `daemon.Kill` is
called before the goroutine has the chance to call `cmd.Wait`.
Signed-off-by: Paweł Gronowski <pawel.gronowski@docker.com>
(cherry picked from commit 88992de283)
Signed-off-by: Paweł Gronowski <pawel.gronowski@docker.com>
TestDaemonRestartKillContainers test was always executing the last case
(`container created should not be restarted`) because the iterated
variables were not copied correctly.
Capture iterated values by value correctly and rename c to tc.
Signed-off-by: Paweł Gronowski <pawel.gronowski@docker.com>
(cherry picked from commit fed1c96e10)
Signed-off-by: Paweł Gronowski <pawel.gronowski@docker.com>
Some newer distros such as RHEL 9 have stopped making the xt_u32 kernel
module available with the kernels they ship. They do ship the xt_bpf
kernel module, which can do everything xt_u32 can and more. Add an
alternative implementation of the iptables match rule which uses xt_bpf
to implement exactly the same logic as the u32 filter using a BPF
program. Try programming the BPF-powered rules as a fallback when
programming the u32-powered rules fails.
Signed-off-by: Cory Snider <csnider@mirantis.com>
(cherry picked from commit 105b9834fb)
Signed-off-by: Cory Snider <csnider@mirantis.com>
The iptables rule clause used to match on the VNI of VXLAN datagrams
looks like line noise to the uninitiated. It doesn't help that the
expression is repeated twice and neither copy has any commentary.
DRY out the rule builder to a common function, and document what the
rule does and how it works.
Signed-off-by: Cory Snider <csnider@mirantis.com>
(cherry picked from commit 44cf27b5fc)
Signed-off-by: Cory Snider <csnider@mirantis.com>
The iptables rules which make encryption mandatory on an encrypted
overlay network are only programmed once there is a second node
participating in the network. This leaves single-node encrypted overlay
networks vulnerable to packet injection. Furthermore, failure to program
the rules is not treated as a fatal error.
Program the iptables rules to make encryption mandatory before creating
the VXLAN link to guarantee that there is no window of time where
incoming cleartext VXLAN packets for the network would be accepted, or
outgoing cleartext packets be transmitted. Only create the VXLAN link if
programming the rules succeeds to ensure that it fails closed.
Signed-off-by: Cory Snider <csnider@mirantis.com>
(cherry picked from commit 142f46cac1)
Signed-off-by: Cory Snider <csnider@mirantis.com>
The overlay-network encryption code is woefully under-documented, which
is especially problematic as it operates on under-documented kernel
interfaces. Document what I have puzzled out of the implementation for
the benefit of the next poor soul to touch this code.
Signed-off-by: Cory Snider <csnider@mirantis.com>
(cherry picked from commit d4fd582fb2)
Signed-off-by: Cory Snider <csnider@mirantis.com>
Volumes created from the image config were not being pruned because the
volume service did not think they were anonymous since the code to
create passes along a generated name instead of letting the volume
service generate it.
This changes the code path to have the volume service generate the name
instead of doing it ahead of time.
Signed-off-by: Brian Goff <cpuguy83@gmail.com>
(cherry picked from commit 146df5fbd3)
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
Signed-off-by: Paweł Gronowski <pawel.gronowski@docker.com>
(cherry picked from commit 4026148ef1)
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
Reported by shfmt
Signed-off-by: Paweł Gronowski <pawel.gronowski@docker.com>
(cherry picked from commit a0741cacef)
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
Commit 3246db3755 added handling for removing
cluster volumes, but in some conditions, this resulted in errors not being
returned if the volume was in use;
docker swarm init
docker volume create foo
docker create -v foo:/foo busybox top
docker volume rm foo
This patch changes the logic for ignoring "local" volume errors if swarm
is enabled (and cluster volumes supported).
While working on this fix, I also discovered that Cluster.RemoveVolume()
did not handle the "force" option correctly; while swarm correctly handled
these, the cluster backend performs a lookup of the volume first (to obtain
its ID), which would fail if the volume didn't exist.
Before this patch:
make TEST_FILTER=TestVolumesRemoveSwarmEnabled DOCKER_GRAPHDRIVER=vfs test-integration
...
Running /go/src/github.com/docker/docker/integration/volume (arm64.integration.volume) flags=-test.v -test.timeout=10m -test.run TestVolumesRemoveSwarmEnabled
...
=== RUN TestVolumesRemoveSwarmEnabled
=== PAUSE TestVolumesRemoveSwarmEnabled
=== CONT TestVolumesRemoveSwarmEnabled
=== RUN TestVolumesRemoveSwarmEnabled/volume_in_use
volume_test.go:122: assertion failed: error is nil, not errdefs.IsConflict
volume_test.go:123: assertion failed: expected an error, got nil
=== RUN TestVolumesRemoveSwarmEnabled/volume_not_in_use
=== RUN TestVolumesRemoveSwarmEnabled/non-existing_volume
=== RUN TestVolumesRemoveSwarmEnabled/non-existing_volume_force
volume_test.go:143: assertion failed: error is not nil: Error response from daemon: volume no_such_volume not found
--- FAIL: TestVolumesRemoveSwarmEnabled (1.57s)
--- FAIL: TestVolumesRemoveSwarmEnabled/volume_in_use (0.00s)
--- PASS: TestVolumesRemoveSwarmEnabled/volume_not_in_use (0.01s)
--- PASS: TestVolumesRemoveSwarmEnabled/non-existing_volume (0.00s)
--- FAIL: TestVolumesRemoveSwarmEnabled/non-existing_volume_force (0.00s)
FAIL
With this patch:
make TEST_FILTER=TestVolumesRemoveSwarmEnabled DOCKER_GRAPHDRIVER=vfs test-integration
...
Running /go/src/github.com/docker/docker/integration/volume (arm64.integration.volume) flags=-test.v -test.timeout=10m -test.run TestVolumesRemoveSwarmEnabled
...
make TEST_FILTER=TestVolumesRemoveSwarmEnabled DOCKER_GRAPHDRIVER=vfs test-integration
...
Running /go/src/github.com/docker/docker/integration/volume (arm64.integration.volume) flags=-test.v -test.timeout=10m -test.run TestVolumesRemoveSwarmEnabled
...
=== RUN TestVolumesRemoveSwarmEnabled
=== PAUSE TestVolumesRemoveSwarmEnabled
=== CONT TestVolumesRemoveSwarmEnabled
=== RUN TestVolumesRemoveSwarmEnabled/volume_in_use
=== RUN TestVolumesRemoveSwarmEnabled/volume_not_in_use
=== RUN TestVolumesRemoveSwarmEnabled/non-existing_volume
=== RUN TestVolumesRemoveSwarmEnabled/non-existing_volume_force
--- PASS: TestVolumesRemoveSwarmEnabled (1.53s)
--- PASS: TestVolumesRemoveSwarmEnabled/volume_in_use (0.00s)
--- PASS: TestVolumesRemoveSwarmEnabled/volume_not_in_use (0.01s)
--- PASS: TestVolumesRemoveSwarmEnabled/non-existing_volume (0.00s)
--- PASS: TestVolumesRemoveSwarmEnabled/non-existing_volume_force (0.00s)
PASS
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
(cherry picked from commit 058a31e479)
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
Includes a security fix for crypto/elliptic (CVE-2023-24532).
> go1.19.7 (released 2023-03-07) includes a security fix to the crypto/elliptic
> package, as well as bug fixes to the linker, the runtime, and the crypto/x509
> and syscall packages. See the Go 1.19.7 milestone on our issue tracker for
> details.
https://go.dev/doc/devel/release#go1.19.minor
From the announcement:
> We have just released Go versions 1.20.2 and 1.19.7, minor point releases.
>
> These minor releases include 1 security fixes following the security policy:
>
> - crypto/elliptic: incorrect P-256 ScalarMult and ScalarBaseMult results
>
> The ScalarMult and ScalarBaseMult methods of the P256 Curve may return an
> incorrect result if called with some specific unreduced scalars (a scalar larger
> than the order of the curve).
>
> This does not impact usages of crypto/ecdsa or crypto/ecdh.
>
> This is CVE-2023-24532 and Go issue https://go.dev/issue/58647.
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
no changes in vendored code; only aligning dependencies
full diff: 80a528a868...a745a8755c
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
(cherry picked from commit 3bbffe96e1)
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
- fix docker service create doesn't work when network and generic-resource are both attached
- Fix removing tasks when a jobs service is removed
- CSI: Allow NodePublishVolume even when plugin does not support staging
full diff: 904c221ac2...80a528a868
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
(cherry picked from commit 088aff1620)
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
- buildinfo: ensure URLs are redacted before written (fixes CVE-2023-26054)
full diff: 4f0ee09c40...70f2ad56d3
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
TestRequestReleaseAddressDuplicate gets flagged by go test -race because
the same err variable inside the test is assigned to from multiple
goroutines without synchronization, which obscures whether or not there
are any data races in the code under test.
Trouble is, the test _depends on_ the data race to exit the loop if an
error occurs inside a spawned goroutine. And the test contains a logical
concurrency bug (not flagged by the Go race detector) which can result
in false-positive test failures. Because a release operation is logged
after the IP is released, the other goroutine could reacquire the
address and log that it was reacquired before the release is logged.
Fix up the test so it is no longer subject to data races or
false-positive test failures, i.e. flakes.
Signed-off-by: Cory Snider <csnider@mirantis.com>
(cherry picked from commit b62445871e)
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
Update hcsshim to v0.9.7 to include fix for graceful termination and pause containers
full diff: https://github.com/containerd/containerd/compare/v1.6.18...v1.6.19
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
(cherry picked from commit ef6f5367dc)
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
- Retain pause.exe as entrypoint for default pause images
- wcow: support graceful termination of servercore containers
full diff: https://github.com/Microsoft/hcsshim/compare/v0.9.6...v0.9.7
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
(cherry picked from commit 5997ad8512)
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
The latest version of containerd-shim-runhcs-v1 (v0.10.0-rc.4) pulled in
with the bump to ContainerD v1.7.0-rc.3 had several changes to make it
more robust, which had the side effect of increasing the worst-case
amount of time it takes for a container to exit in the worst case.
Notably, the total timeout for shutting down a task increased from 30
seconds to 60! Increase the timeouts hardcoded in the daemon and
integration tests so that they don't give up too soon.
Signed-off-by: Cory Snider <csnider@mirantis.com>
(cherry picked from commit d634ae9b60)
Signed-off-by: Cory Snider <csnider@mirantis.com>
"math/rand".Seed
- Migrate to using local RNG instances.
"archive/tar".TypeRegA
- The deprecated constant tar.TypeRegA is the same value as
tar.TypeReg and so is not needed at all.
Signed-off-by: Cory Snider <csnider@mirantis.com>
(cherry picked from commit dea3f2b417)
Signed-off-by: Cory Snider <csnider@mirantis.com>
Go 1.20 made a change to the behaviour of package "os/exec" which was
not mentioned in the release notes:
2b8f214094
Attempts to execute a directory now return syscall.EISDIR instead of
syscall.EACCESS. Check for EISDIR errors from the runtime and fudge the
returned error message to maintain compatibility with existing versions
of docker/cli when using a version of runc compiled with Go 1.20+.
Signed-off-by: Cory Snider <csnider@mirantis.com>
(cherry picked from commit 713e02e03e)
Signed-off-by: Cory Snider <csnider@mirantis.com>
maxDownloadAttempts maps to the daemon configuration flag
--max-download-attempts int
Set the max download attempts for each pull (default 5)
and the daemon configuration machinery interprets a value of 0 as "apply
the default value" and not a valid user value (config validation/
normalization bugs notwithstanding). The intention is clearly that this
configuration value should be an upper limit on the number of times the
daemon should try to download a particular layer before giving up. So it
is surprising to have the configuration value interpreted as a _retry_
limit. The daemon will make up to N+1 attempts to download a layer! This
also means users cannot disable retries even if they wanted to.
As this is a longstanding bug, not a recent regression, it would not be
appropriate to backport the fix (97921915a8)
in a patch release. Update the test to assert on the buggy behaviour so
it passes again.
Signed-off-by: Cory Snider <csnider@mirantis.com>
