The twelfth patch release for containerd 1.6 contains a fix for CVE-2022-23471.
Notable Updates
- Fix goroutine leak during Exec in CRI plugin (GHSA-2qjp-425j-52j9)
full diff: https://github.com/containerd/containerd/compare/v1.6.11...v1.6.12
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
Welcome to the v1.6.11 release of containerd!
The eleventh patch release for containerd 1.6 contains a various fixes and updates.
Notable Updates
- Add pod UID annotation in CRI plugin
- Fix nil pointer deference for Windows containers in CRI plugin
- Fix lease labels unexpectedly overwriting expiration
- Fix for simultaneous diff creation using the same parent snapshot
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
Includes security fixes for net/http (CVE-2022-41717, CVE-2022-41720),
and os (CVE-2022-41720).
These minor releases include 2 security fixes following the security policy:
- os, net/http: avoid escapes from os.DirFS and http.Dir on Windows
The os.DirFS function and http.Dir type provide access to a tree of files
rooted at a given directory. These functions permitted access to Windows
device files under that root. For example, os.DirFS("C:/tmp").Open("COM1")
would open the COM1 device.
Both os.DirFS and http.Dir only provide read-only filesystem access.
In addition, on Windows, an os.DirFS for the directory \(the root of the
current drive) can permit a maliciously crafted path to escape from the
drive and access any path on the system.
The behavior of os.DirFS("") has changed. Previously, an empty root was
treated equivalently to "/", so os.DirFS("").Open("tmp") would open the
path "/tmp". This now returns an error.
This is CVE-2022-41720 and Go issue https://go.dev/issue/56694.
- net/http: limit canonical header cache by bytes, not entries
An attacker can cause excessive memory growth in a Go server accepting
HTTP/2 requests.
HTTP/2 server connections contain a cache of HTTP header keys sent by
the client. While the total number of entries in this cache is capped,
an attacker sending very large keys can cause the server to allocate
approximately 64 MiB per open connection.
This issue is also fixed in golang.org/x/net/http2 vX.Y.Z, for users
manually configuring HTTP/2.
Thanks to Josselin Costanzi for reporting this issue.
This is CVE-2022-41717 and Go issue https://go.dev/issue/56350.
View the release notes for more information:
https://go.dev/doc/devel/release#go1.18.9
And the milestone on the issue tracker:
https://github.com/golang/go/issues?q=milestone%3AGo1.18.9+label%3ACherryPickApproved
Full diff: https://github.com/golang/go/compare/go1.18.8...go1.18.9
The golang.org/x/net fix is in 1e63c2f08a
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
This addresses a regression introduced in 407e3a4552,
which turned out to be "too strict", as there's old images that use, for example;
docker pull python:3.5.1-alpine
3.5.1-alpine: Pulling from library/python
unsupported media type application/octet-stream
Before 407e3a4552, such mediatypes were accepted;
docker pull python:3.5.1-alpine
3.5.1-alpine: Pulling from library/python
e110a4a17941: Pull complete
30dac23631f0: Pull complete
202fc3980a36: Pull complete
Digest: sha256:f88925c97b9709dd6da0cb2f811726da9d724464e9be17a964c70f067d2aa64a
Status: Downloaded newer image for python:3.5.1-alpine
docker.io/library/python:3.5.1-alpine
This patch copies the additional media-types, using the list of types that
were added in a215e15cb1, which fixed a
similar issue.
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
(cherry picked from commit a6a539497a)
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
This syncs the seccomp-profile with the latest changes in containerd's
profile, applying the same changes as 17a9324035
Some background from the associated ticket:
> We want to use vsock for guest-host communication on KubeVirt
> (https://github.com/kubevirt/kubevirt). In KubeVirt we run VMs in pods.
>
> However since anyone can just connect from any pod to any VM with the
> default seccomp settings, we cannot limit connection attempts to our
> privileged node-agent.
>
> ### Describe the solution you'd like
> We want to deny the `socket` syscall for the `AF_VSOCK` family by default.
>
> I see in [1] and [2] that AF_VSOCK was actually already blocked for some
> time, but that got reverted since some architectures support the `socketcall`
> syscall which can't be restricted properly. However we are mostly interested
> in `arm64` and `amd64` where limiting `socket` would probably be enough.
>
> ### Additional context
> I know that in theory we could use our own seccomp profiles, but we would want
> to provide security for as many users as possible which use KubeVirt, and there
> it would be very helpful if this protection could be added by being part of the
> DefaultRuntime profile to easily ensure that it is active for all pods [3].
>
> Impact on existing workloads: It is unlikely that this will disturb any existing
> workload, becuase VSOCK is almost exclusively used for host-guest commmunication.
> However if someone would still use it: Privileged pods would still be able to
> use `socket` for `AF_VSOCK`, custom seccomp policies could be applied too.
> Further it was already blocked for quite some time and the blockade got lifted
> due to reasons not related to AF_VSOCK.
>
> The PR in KubeVirt which adds VSOCK support for additional context: [4]
>
> [1]: https://github.com/moby/moby/pull/29076#commitcomment-21831387
> [2]: dcf2632945
> [3]: https://kubernetes.io/docs/tutorials/security/seccomp/#enable-the-use-of-runtimedefault-as-the-default-seccomp-profile-for-all-workloads
> [4]: https://github.com/kubevirt/kubevirt/pull/8546
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
(cherry picked from commit 57b229012a)
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
Currently an attempt to pull a reference which resolves to an OCI
artifact (Helm chart for example), results in a bit unrelated error
message `invalid rootfs in image configuration`.
This provides a more meaningful error in case a user attempts to
download a media type which isn't image related.
Signed-off-by: Paweł Gronowski <pawel.gronowski@docker.com>
(cherry picked from commit 407e3a4552)
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
On Windows, syscall.StartProcess and os/exec.Cmd did not properly
check for invalid environment variable values. A malicious
environment variable value could exploit this behavior to set a
value for a different environment variable. For example, the
environment variable string "A=B\x00C=D" set the variables "A=B" and
"C=D".
Thanks to RyotaK (https://twitter.com/ryotkak) for reporting this
issue.
This is CVE-2022-41716 and Go issue https://go.dev/issue/56284.
This Go release also fixes https://github.com/golang/go/issues/56309, a
runtime bug which can cause random memory corruption when a goroutine
exits with runtime.LockOSThread() set. This fix is necessary to unblock
work to replace certain uses of pkg/reexec with unshared OS threads.
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
- winterm: GetStdFile(): Added compatibility with "golang.org/x/sys/windows"
- winterm: fix GetStdFile() falltrough
- update deprecation message to refer to the correct replacement
- add go.mod
- Fix int overflow
- Convert int to string using rune()
full diff:
- bea5bbe245...3f7ff695ad
- d6e3b3328b...d185dfc1b5
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
(cherry picked from commit af1e74555a)
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
- On Windows, we don't build and run a local test registry (we're not running
docker-in-docker), so we need to skip this test.
- On rootless, networking doesn't support this (currently)
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
(cherry picked from commit 4f43cb660a)
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
Setting cmd.Env overrides the default of passing through the parent
process' environment, which works out fine most of the time, except when
it doesn't. For whatever reason, leaving out all the environment causes
git-for-windows sh.exe subprocesses to enter an infinite loop of
access violations during Cygwin initialization in certain environments
(specifically, our very own dev container image).
Signed-off-by: Cory Snider <csnider@mirantis.com>
Previously, Docker Hub was excluded when configuring "allow-nondistributable-artifacts".
With the updated policy announced by Microsoft, we can remove this restriction;
https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/containers/announcing-windows-container-base-image-redistribution-rights/ba-p/3645201
There are plans to deprecated support for foreign layers altogether in the OCI,
and we should consider to make this option the default, but as that requires
deprecating the option (and possibly keeping an "opt-out" option), we can look
at that separately.
(cherry picked from commit 30e5333ce3)
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
Signed-off-by: Tianon Gravi <admwiggin@gmail.com>
This is accomplished by storing the distribution source in the content
labels. If the distribution source is not found then we check to the
registry to see if the digest exists in the repo, if it does exist then
the puller will use it.
Signed-off-by: Brian Goff <cpuguy83@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
While it is undesirable for the system or user git config to be used
when the daemon clones a Git repo, it could break workflows if it was
unconditionally applied to docker/cli as well.
Signed-off-by: Cory Snider <csnider@mirantis.com>
Prevent git commands we run from reading the user or system
configuration, or cloning submodules from the local filesystem.
Signed-off-by: Cory Snider <csnider@mirantis.com>
Keep It Simple! Set the working directory for git commands by...setting
the git process's working directory. Git commands can be run in the
parent process's working directory by passing the empty string.
Signed-off-by: Cory Snider <csnider@mirantis.com>
Make the test more debuggable by logging all git command output and
running each table-driven test case as a subtest.
Signed-off-by: Cory Snider <csnider@mirantis.com>
From the mailing list:
We have just released Go versions 1.19.2 and 1.18.7, minor point releases.
These minor releases include 3 security fixes following the security policy:
- archive/tar: unbounded memory consumption when reading headers
Reader.Read did not set a limit on the maximum size of file headers.
A maliciously crafted archive could cause Read to allocate unbounded
amounts of memory, potentially causing resource exhaustion or panics.
Reader.Read now limits the maximum size of header blocks to 1 MiB.
Thanks to Adam Korczynski (ADA Logics) and OSS-Fuzz for reporting this issue.
This is CVE-2022-2879 and Go issue https://go.dev/issue/54853.
- net/http/httputil: ReverseProxy should not forward unparseable query parameters
Requests forwarded by ReverseProxy included the raw query parameters from the
inbound request, including unparseable parameters rejected by net/http. This
could permit query parameter smuggling when a Go proxy forwards a parameter
with an unparseable value.
ReverseProxy will now sanitize the query parameters in the forwarded query
when the outbound request's Form field is set after the ReverseProxy.Director
function returns, indicating that the proxy has parsed the query parameters.
Proxies which do not parse query parameters continue to forward the original
query parameters unchanged.
Thanks to Gal Goldstein (Security Researcher, Oxeye) and
Daniel Abeles (Head of Research, Oxeye) for reporting this issue.
This is CVE-2022-2880 and Go issue https://go.dev/issue/54663.
- regexp/syntax: limit memory used by parsing regexps
The parsed regexp representation is linear in the size of the input,
but in some cases the constant factor can be as high as 40,000,
making relatively small regexps consume much larger amounts of memory.
Each regexp being parsed is now limited to a 256 MB memory footprint.
Regular expressions whose representation would use more space than that
are now rejected. Normal use of regular expressions is unaffected.
Thanks to Adam Korczynski (ADA Logics) and OSS-Fuzz for reporting this issue.
This is CVE-2022-41715 and Go issue https://go.dev/issue/55949.
View the release notes for more information: https://go.dev/doc/devel/release#go1.18.7
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
Before this change restarting the daemon in live-restore with running
containers + a restart policy meant that volume refs were not restored.
This specifically happens when the container is still running *and*
there is a restart policy that would make sure the container was running
again on restart.
The bug allows volumes to be removed even though containers are
referencing them. 😱
Signed-off-by: Brian Goff <cpuguy83@gmail.com>
(cherry picked from commit 4c0e0979b4)
Signed-off-by: Brian Goff <cpuguy83@gmail.com>
The `docker` CLI currently doesn't handle situations where the current context
(as defined in `~/.docker/config.json`) is invalid or doesn't exist. As loading
(and checking) the context happens during initialization of the CLI, this
prevents `docker context` commands from being used, which makes it complicated
to fix the situation. For example, running `docker context use <correct context>`
would fail, which makes it not possible to update the `~/.docker/config.json`,
unless doing so manually.
For example, given the following `~/.docker/config.json`:
```json
{
"currentContext": "nosuchcontext"
}
```
All of the commands below fail:
```bash
docker context inspect rootless
Current context "nosuchcontext" is not found on the file system, please check your config file at /Users/thajeztah/.docker/config.json
docker context rm --force rootless
Current context "nosuchcontext" is not found on the file system, please check your config file at /Users/thajeztah/.docker/config.json
docker context use default
Current context "nosuchcontext" is not found on the file system, please check your config file at /Users/thajeztah/.docker/config.json
```
While these things should be fixed, this patch updates the script to switch
the context using the `--context` flag; this flag is taken into account when
initializing the CLI, so that having an invalid context configured won't
block `docker context` commands from being executed. Given that all `context`
commands are local operations, "any" context can be used (it doesn't need to
make a connection with the daemon).
With this patch, those commands can now be run (and won't fail for the wrong
reason);
```bash
docker --context=default context inspect -f "{{.Name}}" rootless
rootless
docker --context=default context inspect -f "{{.Name}}" rootless-doesnt-exist
context "rootless-doesnt-exist" does not exist
```
One other issue may also cause things to fail during uninstall; trying to remove
a context that doesn't exist will fail (even with the `-f` / `--force` option
set);
```bash
docker --context=default context rm blablabla
Error: context "blablabla": not found
```
While this is "ok" in most circumstances, it also means that (potentially) the
current context is not reset to "default", so this patch adds an explicit
`docker context use`, as well as unsetting the `DOCKER_HOST` and `DOCKER_CONTEXT`
environment variables.
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
(cherry picked from commit e2114731e7)
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
