Path-specific rules were removed, so this is no longer used.
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
(cherry picked from commit 530e63c1a61b105a6f7fc143c5acb9b5cd87f958)
Signed-off-by: Tibor Vass <tibor@docker.com>
(cherry picked from commit f8a0f26843)
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
Commit 77b8465d7e added a secret update
endpoint to allow updating labels on existing secrets. However, when
implementing the endpoint, the DebugRequestMiddleware was not updated
to scrub the Data field (as is being done when creating a secret).
When updating a secret (to set labels), the Data field should be either
`nil` (not set), or contain the same value as the existing secret. In
situations where the Data field is set, and the `dockerd` daemon is
running with debugging enabled / log-level debug, the base64-encoded
value of the secret is printed to the daemon logs.
The docker cli does not have a `docker secret update` command, but
when using `docker stack deploy`, the docker cli sends the secret
data both when _creating_ a stack, and when _updating_ a stack, thus
leaking the secret data if the daemon runs with debug enabled:
1. Start the daemon in debug-mode
dockerd --debug
2. Initialize swarm
docker swarm init
3. Create a file containing a secret
echo secret > my_secret.txt
4. Create a docker-compose file using that secret
cat > docker-compose.yml <<'EOF'
version: "3.3"
services:
web:
image: nginx:alpine
secrets:
- my_secret
secrets:
my_secret:
file: ./my_secret.txt
EOF
5. Deploy the stack
docker stack deploy -c docker-compose.yml test
6. Verify that the secret is scrubbed in the daemon logs
DEBU[2019-07-01T22:36:08.170617400Z] Calling POST /v1.30/secrets/create
DEBU[2019-07-01T22:36:08.171364900Z] form data: {"Data":"*****","Labels":{"com.docker.stack.namespace":"test"},"Name":"test_my_secret"}
7. Re-deploy the stack to trigger an "update"
docker stack deploy -c docker-compose.yml test
8. Notice that this time, the Data field is not scrubbed, and the base64-encoded secret is logged
DEBU[2019-07-01T22:37:35.828819400Z] Calling POST /v1.30/secrets/w3hgvwpzl8yooq5ctnyp71v52/update?version=34
DEBU[2019-07-01T22:37:35.829993700Z] form data: {"Data":"c2VjcmV0Cg==","Labels":{"com.docker.stack.namespace":"test"},"Name":"test_my_secret"}
This patch modifies `maskSecretKeys` to unconditionally scrub `Data` fields.
Currently, only the `secrets` and `configs` endpoints use a field with this
name, and no other POST API endpoints use a data field, so scrubbing this
field unconditionally will only scrub requests for those endpoints.
If a new endpoint is added in future where this field should not be scrubbed,
we can re-introduce more fine-grained (path-specific) handling.
This patch introduces some change in behavior:
- In addition to secrets, requests to create or update _configs_ will
now have their `Data` field scrubbed. Generally, the actual data should
not be interesting for debugging, so likely will not be problematic.
In addition, scrubbing this data for configs may actually be desirable,
because (even though they are not explicitely designed for this purpose)
configs may contain sensitive data (credentials inside a configuration
file, e.g.).
- Requests that send key/value pairs as a "map" and that contain a
key named "data", will see the value of that field scrubbed. This
means that (e.g.) setting a `label` named `data` on a config, will
scrub/mask the value of that label.
- Note that this is already the case for any label named `jointoken`,
`password`, `secret`, `signingcakey`, or `unlockkey`.
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
(cherry picked from commit c7ce4be93ae8edd2da62a588e01c67313a4aba0c)
Signed-off-by: Tibor Vass <tibor@docker.com>
(cherry picked from commit 73db8c77bf)
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
(cherry picked from commit 32d70c7e21631224674cd60021d3ec908c2d888c)
Signed-off-by: Tibor Vass <tibor@docker.com>
(cherry picked from commit ebb542b3f8)
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
Add tests for
- case-insensitive matching of fields
- recursive masking
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
(cherry picked from commit db5f811216e70bcb4a10e477c1558d6c68f618c5)
Signed-off-by: Tibor Vass <tibor@docker.com>
(cherry picked from commit 18dac2cf32)
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
Signed-off-by: Akihiro Suda <akihiro.suda.cz@hco.ntt.co.jp>
(cherry picked from commit ca5aab19b4)
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
Currently the API spec would allow `"443/tcp": [null]`, but what should
be allowed is `"443/tcp": null`
Signed-off-by: Dominic Tubach <dominic.tubach@to.com>
(cherry picked from commit 32b5d296ea)
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
This patch hard-codes support for NVIDIA GPUs.
In a future patch it should move out into its own Device Plugin.
Signed-off-by: Tibor Vass <tibor@docker.com>
Running a cluster in a two-manager configuration effectively *doubles*
the chance of loosing control over the cluster (compared to running
in a single-manager setup). Users may have the assumption that having
two managers provides fault tolerance, so it's best to warn them if
they're using this configuration.
This patch adds a warning to the `info` response if Swarm is configured
with two managers:
WARNING: Running Swarm in a two-manager configuration. This configuration provides
no fault tolerance, and poses a high risk to loose control over the cluster.
Refer to https://docs.docker.com/engine/swarm/admin_guide/ to configure the
Swarm for fault-tolerance.
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
This utility allows a client to convert an API response
back to a typed error; allowing the client to perform
different actions based on the type of error, without
having to resort to string-matching the error.
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
Signed-off-by: John Howard <jhoward@microsoft.com>
Also fixes https://github.com/moby/moby/issues/22874
This commit is a pre-requisite to moving moby/moby on Windows to using
Containerd for its runtime.
The reason for this is that the interface between moby and containerd
for the runtime is an OCI spec which must be unambigious.
It is the responsibility of the runtime (runhcs in the case of
containerd on Windows) to ensure that arguments are escaped prior
to calling into HCS and onwards to the Win32 CreateProcess call.
Previously, the builder was always escaping arguments which has
led to several bugs in moby. Because the local runtime in
libcontainerd had context of whether or not arguments were escaped,
it was possible to hack around in daemon/oci_windows.go with
knowledge of the context of the call (from builder or not).
With a remote runtime, this is not possible as there's rightly
no context of the caller passed across in the OCI spec. Put another
way, as I put above, the OCI spec must be unambigious.
The other previous limitation (which leads to various subtle bugs)
is that moby is coded entirely from a Linux-centric point of view.
Unfortunately, Windows != Linux. Windows CreateProcess uses a
command line, not an array of arguments. And it has very specific
rules about how to escape a command line. Some interesting reading
links about this are:
https://blogs.msdn.microsoft.com/twistylittlepassagesallalike/2011/04/23/everyone-quotes-command-line-arguments-the-wrong-way/https://stackoverflow.com/questions/31838469/how-do-i-convert-argv-to-lpcommandline-parameter-of-createprocesshttps://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/cpp/cpp/parsing-cpp-command-line-arguments?view=vs-2017
For this reason, the OCI spec has recently been updated to cater
for more natural syntax by including a CommandLine option in
Process.
What does this commit do?
Primary objective is to ensure that the built OCI spec is unambigious.
It changes the builder so that `ArgsEscaped` as commited in a
layer is only controlled by the use of CMD or ENTRYPOINT.
Subsequently, when calling in to create a container from the builder,
if follows a different path to both `docker run` and `docker create`
using the added `ContainerCreateIgnoreImagesArgsEscaped`. This allows
a RUN from the builder to control how to escape in the OCI spec.
It changes the builder so that when shell form is used for RUN,
CMD or ENTRYPOINT, it builds (for WCOW) a more natural command line
using the original as put by the user in the dockerfile, not
the parsed version as a set of args which loses fidelity.
This command line is put into args[0] and `ArgsEscaped` is set
to true for CMD or ENTRYPOINT. A RUN statement does not commit
`ArgsEscaped` to the commited layer regardless or whether shell
or exec form were used.
- Don't set `PidsLimit` when creating a container and
no limit was set (or the limit was set to "unlimited")
- Don't set `PidsLimit` if the host does not have pids-limit
support (previously "unlimited" was set).
- Do not generate a warning if the host does not have pids-limit
support, but pids-limit was set to unlimited (having no
limit set, or the limit set to "unlimited" is equivalent,
so no warning is nescessary in that case).
- When updating a container, convert `0`, and `-1` to
"unlimited" (`0`).
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
This changes the default ipc mode of daemon/engine to be private,
meaning the containers will not have their /dev/shm bind-mounted
from the host by default. The benefits of doing this are:
1. No leaked mounts. Eliminate a possibility to leak mounts into
other namespaces (and therefore unfortunate errors like "Unable to
remove filesystem for <ID>: remove /var/lib/docker/containers/<ID>/shm:
device or resource busy").
2. Working checkpoint/restore. Make `docker checkpoint`
not lose the contents of `/dev/shm`, but save it to
the dump, and be restored back upon `docker start --checkpoint`
(currently it is lost -- while CRIU handles tmpfs mounts,
the "shareable" mount is seen as external to container,
and thus rightfully ignored).
3. Better security. Currently any container is opened to share
its /dev/shm with any other container.
Obviously, this change will break the following usage scenario:
$ docker run -d --name donor busybox top
$ docker run --rm -it --ipc container:donor busybox sh
Error response from daemon: linux spec namespaces: can't join IPC
of container <ID>: non-shareable IPC (hint: use IpcMode:shareable
for the donor container)
The soution, as hinted by the (amended) error message, is to
explicitly enable donor sharing by using --ipc shareable:
$ docker run -d --name donor --ipc shareable busybox top
Compatibility notes:
1. This only applies to containers created _after_ this change.
Existing containers are not affected and will work fine
as their ipc mode is stored in HostConfig.
2. Old backward compatible behavior ("shareable" containers
by default) can be enabled by either using
`--default-ipc-mode shareable` daemon command line option,
or by adding a `"default-ipc-mode": "shareable"`
line in `/etc/docker/daemon.json` configuration file.
3. If an older client (API < 1.40) is used, a "shareable" container
is created. A test to check that is added.
Signed-off-by: Kir Kolyshkin <kolyshkin@gmail.com>
There are two if statements checking for exactly same conditions:
> if hostConfig != nil && versions.LessThan(version, "1.40")
Merge these.
Signed-off-by: Kir Kolyshkin <kolyshkin@gmail.com>
Like its counterpart in images and volumes, introduce the dangling
filter while listing networks. When the filter value is set to true,
only networks which aren't attached to containers and aren't builtin
networks are shown. When set to false, all builtin networks and
networks which are attached to containers are shown.
Signed-off-by: Karthik Nayak <Karthik.188@gmail.com>
Older API clients did not use a pointer for `PidsLimit`, so
API requests would always send `0`, resulting in any previous
value to be reset after an update:
Before this patch:
(using a 17.06 Docker CLI):
```bash
docker run -dit --name test --pids-limit=16 busybox
docker container inspect --format '{{json .HostConfig.PidsLimit}}' test
16
docker container update --memory=100M --memory-swap=200M test
docker container inspect --format '{{json .HostConfig.PidsLimit}}' test
0
docker container exec test cat /sys/fs/cgroup/pids/pids.max
max
```
With this patch applied:
(using a 17.06 Docker CLI):
```bash
docker run -dit --name test --pids-limit=16 busybox
docker container inspect --format '{{json .HostConfig.PidsLimit}}' test
16
docker container update --memory=100M --memory-swap=200M test
docker container inspect --format '{{json .HostConfig.PidsLimit}}' test
16
docker container exec test cat /sys/fs/cgroup/pids/pids.max
16
```
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
