This commit makes the Shell check for errors after a node is run(), and
prevents further execution by unwinding until the error is cleared.
Fixes#10649.
This rule appears to produce a lot of noise, most of them look like
false positives (400+). Lets suppress for now to try to move the signal
to noise ratio higher for PVS-Studio.
Reference: https://pvs-studio.com/en/docs/warnings/v1047/
DateTime::create() and subsequently DateTime::set_time() uses mktime()
internally to ensure out-of-range input values still result in a valid
date (Jan 32 -> Feb 1 etc.).
This however also means that the input is treated as local time, and
then shifted to UTC accordingly for the returned time_t - it is however
already in UTC in this case! The temporary solution is simply to set the
"TZ" environment variable to "UTC" and back after create(). The proper
solution is probably to have better timezone support in Core::DateTime.
This should only affect Lagom, as serenity itself has no timezone
support yet and always assumes UTC.
Just like in the previous commit, the day value of Core::DateTime is
one-based, not zero based.
Noticed while implementing a new Temporal function, this likely would've
been caught earlier if we'd also use it for the Date API (we don't).
Just like month, the day value here is one-based. This resulted in the
following situation, which is obviously unexpected:
Core::DateTime::create(1970); // 1970-01-00 -> 1969-12-31
When we receive HTTP payloads, we have to ensure that the number of
bytes read is *at most* the value specified in the Content-Length
header.
However, we did not use the correct value when calculating the truncated
size of the last payload. `m_buffered_size` does not store the total
number of bytes received, but rather the number of bytes that haven't
been read from us.
This means that if some data has already been read from us,
`m_buffered_size` is smaller than `m_received_size`. Because of this, we
ended up resizing the `payload` ByteBuffer to a larger size than its
contents. This garbage data was then read by consumers, producing this
warning when executing scripts:
> Extension byte 0xdc in 1 position after first byte 0xdc doesn't make
> sense.