I dont know why we do a fast path in the Kernel, but not in Userspace
Also simplified the byte explosion in memset to "explode_byte"
it even seemed so, that we missed the highest byte when memseting something
Alot of code is shared between i386/i686/x86 and x86_64
and a lot probably will be used for compatability modes.
So we start by moving the headers into one Directory.
We will probalby be able to move some cpp files aswell.
(...and ASSERT_NOT_REACHED => VERIFY_NOT_REACHED)
Since all of these checks are done in release builds as well,
let's rename them to VERIFY to prevent confusion, as everyone is
used to assertions being compiled out in release.
We can introduce a new ASSERT macro that is specifically for debug
checks, but I'm doing this wholesale conversion first since we've
accumulated thousands of these already, and it's not immediately
obvious which ones are suitable for ASSERT.
Since the CPU already does almost all necessary validation steps
for us, we don't really need to attempt to do this. Doing it
ourselves doesn't really work very reliably, because we'd have to
account for other processors modifying virtual memory, and we'd
have to account for e.g. pages not being able to be allocated
due to insufficient resources.
So change the copy_to/from_user (and associated helper functions)
to use the new safe_memcpy, which will return whether it succeeded
or not. The only manual validation step needed (which the CPU
can't perform for us) is making sure the pointers provided by user
mode aren't pointing to kernel mappings.
To make it easier to read/write from/to either kernel or user mode
data add the UserOrKernelBuffer helper class, which will internally
either use copy_from/to_user or directly memcpy, or pass the data
through directly using a temporary buffer on the stack.
Last but not least we need to keep syscall params trivial as we
need to copy them from/to user mode using copy_from/to_user.
This commit adds an implementation of memmem, using the Bitap text
search algorithm for needles smaller than 32 bytes, and a naive loop
search for longer needles.
This was supposed to be the foundation for some kind of pre-kernel
environment, but nobody is working on it right now, so let's move
everything back into the kernel and remove all the confusion.
This will panic the kernel immediately if these functions are misused
so we can catch it and fix the misuse.
This patch fixes a couple of misuses:
- create_signal_trampolines() writes to a user-accessible page
above the 3GB address mark. We should really get rid of this
page but that's a whole other thing.
- CoW faults need to use copy_from_user rather than copy_to_user
since it's the *source* pointer that points to user memory.
- Inode faults need to use memcpy rather than copy_to_user since
we're copying a kernel stack buffer into a quickmapped page.
This should make the copy_to/from_user() functions slightly less useful
for exploitation. Before this, they were essentially just glorified
memcpy() with SMAP disabled. :^)
As suggested by Joshua, this commit adds the 2-clause BSD license as a
comment block to the top of every source file.
For the first pass, I've just added myself for simplicity. I encourage
everyone to add themselves as copyright holders of any file they've
added or modified in some significant way. If I've added myself in
error somewhere, feel free to replace it with the appropriate copyright
holder instead.
Going forward, all new source files should include a license header.
This patch introduces a helpful copy_string_from_user() function
that takes a bounded null-terminated string from userspace memory
and copies it into a String object.
Supervisor Mode Access Prevention (SMAP) is an x86 CPU feature that
prevents the kernel from accessing userspace memory. With SMAP enabled,
trying to read/write a userspace memory address while in the kernel
will now generate a page fault.
Since it's sometimes necessary to read/write userspace memory, there
are two new instructions that quickly switch the protection on/off:
STAC (disables protection) and CLAC (enables protection.)
These are exposed in kernel code via the stac() and clac() helpers.
There's also a SmapDisabler RAII object that can be used to ensure
that you don't forget to re-enable protection before returning to
userspace code.
THis patch also adds copy_to_user(), copy_from_user() and memset_user()
which are the "correct" way of doing things. These functions allow us
to briefly disable protection for a specific purpose, and then turn it
back on immediately after it's done. Going forward all kernel code
should be moved to using these and all uses of SmapDisabler are to be
considered FIXME's.
Note that we're not realizing the full potential of this feature since
I've used SmapDisabler quite liberally in this initial bring-up patch.
Use simple stack cookies to try to provoke an assertion failure on
stack overflow.
This is far from perfect, since we use a constant cookie instead of
generating a random one on startup, but it can still help us catch
bugs, which is the primary concern right now. :^)
Turns out we can use abi::__cxa_demangle() for this, and all we need to
provide is sprintf(), realloc() and free(), so this patch exposes them.
We now have fully demangled C++ backtraces :^)
This allows us to get rid of all the custom 64-bit division helpers.
I wanted to do this ages ago but couldn't get it working. Turns out it
was unstable due to libgcc using the regular ABI and the kernel being
built with -mregparm=3.
Now that we build the kernel with regular calls, we can just link with
libgcc and get this stuff for free. :^)
This is just a wrapper around strstr() for now. There are many better
ways to search for a string within a string, but I'm just adding a nice
API at the moment. :^)
We had some kernel-specific gizmos in AK that should really just be in the
Kernel subdirectory instead. The only thing remaining after moving those
was mmx_memcpy() which I moved to the ARCH(i386)-specific section of
LibC/string.cpp.
I just discovered the hard way that clobbering FPU/MMX/SSE registers in the
kernel makes things very confusing for userspace (and other kernel threads.)
Let's banish all of those things from the kernel to keep things simple.
This is useful for static locals that never need to be destroyed:
Thing& Thing::the()
{
static Eternal<Thing> the;
return the;
}
The object will be allocated in data segment memory and will never have
its destructor invoked.
The scheduler now operates on threads, rather than on processes.
Each process has a main thread, and can have any number of additional
threads. The process exits when the main thread exits.
This patch doesn't actually spawn any additional threads, it merely
does all the plumbing needed to make it possible. :^)
Now the filesystem is generated on-the-fly instead of manually adding and
removing inodes as processes spawn and die.
The code is convoluted and bloated as I wrote it while sleepless. However,
it's still vastly better than the old ProcFS, so I'm committing it.
I also added /proc/PID/fd/N symlinks for each of a process's open fd's.
