This patch makes it so that if the find/replace widget is opened while
some text is selected, the find textbox's content is overrided with the
selected text.
This patch adds a new replace widget that cooperates with the find
widget, the replace widget takes the input in the find textbox, searches
for occurences of that input, and replaces them with the input provied
in the replace textbox.
This is the first complex app to use pledge(), and it was extremely
easy to get it working.
The main trickiness comes from the RPC sockets that get set up inside
the GApplication constructor. Since it wants to unlink any old RPC
socket with the same filename and change the file mode of the new
socket, it needs both "cpath" and "fattr".
Once the GApplication has been constructed, it seems we can safely
drop those promises. Pretty cool!
This patch implements basic support for OpenBSD-style pledge().
pledge() allows programs to incrementally reduce their set of allowed
syscalls, which are divided into categories that each make up a subset
of POSIX functionality.
If a process violates one of its pledged promises by attempting to call
a syscall that it previously said it wouldn't call, the process is
immediately terminated with an uncatchable SIGABRT.
This is by no means complete, and we'll need to add more checks in
various places to ensure that promises are being kept.
But it is pretty cool! :^)
The system menu can now be opened by pressing the window key even while
in a focused window. The current menu can also now be closed by pressing
escape.
We still cannot navigate a menu using arrow keys while there is an
active window, but this is another step towards that.
m_current_menu was being set and then immediately cleared by
close_everyone(). Furthermore, since the menu being set can be a
nullptr, we now also make sure to handle that.
Finally, the logic can be simplified. close on the current menu is not
required, as that is also done by close_everyone().
You can now bind-mount files and directories. This essentially exposes an
existing part of the file system in another place, and can be used as an
alternative to symlinks or hardlinks.
Here's an example of doing this:
# mkdir /tmp/foo
# mount /home/anon/myfile.txt /tmp/foo -o bind
# cat /tmp/foo
This is anon's file.
We now support these mount flags:
* MS_NODEV: disallow opening any devices from this file system
* MS_NOEXEC: disallow executing any executables from this file system
* MS_NOSUID: ignore set-user-id bits on executables from this file system
The fourth flag, MS_BIND, is defined, but currently ignored.
O_EXEC is mentioned by POSIX, so let's have it. Currently, it is only used
inside the kernel to ensure the process has the right permissions when opening
an executable.
At the moment, the actual flags are ignored, but we correctly propagate them all
the way from the original mount() syscall to each custody that resides on the
mounted FS.
No need to pass around RefPtr<>s and NonnullRefPtr<>s and no need to
heap-allocate them.
Also remove VFS::mount(NonnullRefPtr<FS>&&, StringView path) - it has been
unused for a long time.
We're gonna need to handle overflow better than this, but at least this
way we can see the top of the menu, even if we can't scroll down to see
the rest of it.
For #1043.
This is probably not the final design we'll want for this, but for now
let's run the HTTP client code as a separate user to reduce exposure
for the standard "anon" user account.
Note that "protocol" is also added to the "lookup" group, in order to
allow ProtocolServer to contact LookupServer for DNS requests.
Other implementations of pthread_setname_np() do not take the name
length as an argument.
For pthread_getname_np(), other implementations take the buffer size
as a size_t.
This patch brings us in line with other implementations.
While I was updating syscalls to stop passing null-terminated strings,
I added some helpful struct types:
- StringArgument { const char*; size_t; }
- ImmutableBuffer<Data, Size> { const Data*; Size; }
- MutableBuffer<Data, Size> { Data*; Size; }
The Process class has some convenience functions for validating and
optionally extracting the contents from these structs:
- get_syscall_path_argument(StringArgument)
- validate_and_copy_string_from_user(StringArgument)
- validate(ImmutableBuffer)
- validate(MutableBuffer)
There's still so much code around this and I'm wondering if we should
generate most of it instead. Possible nice little project.
