moby/oci
Bjorn Neergaard 83cac3c3e3
oci/defaults: deny /sys/devices/virtual/powercap
The ability to read these files may offer a power-based sidechannel
attack against any workloads running on the same kernel.

This was originally [CVE-2020-8694][1], which was fixed in
[949dd0104c496fa7c14991a23c03c62e44637e71][2] by restricting read access
to root. However, since many containers run as root, this is not
sufficient for our use case.

While untrusted code should ideally never be run, we can add some
defense in depth here by masking out the device class by default.

[Other mechanisms][3] to access this hardware exist, but they should not
be accessible to a container due to other safeguards in the
kernel/container stack (e.g. capabilities, perf paranoia).

[1]: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-8694
[2]: 949dd0104c
[3]: https://web.eece.maine.edu/~vweaver/projects/rapl/

Signed-off-by: Bjorn Neergaard <bjorn.neergaard@docker.com>
2023-09-18 16:40:03 -06:00
..
caps Switch all logging to use containerd log pkg 2023-06-24 00:23:44 +00:00
fixtures Fix permissions on oci fixtures files 2020-11-27 10:29:47 +07:00
defaults.go oci/defaults: deny /sys/devices/virtual/powercap 2023-09-18 16:40:03 -06:00
devices_linux.go oci: use filepath.WalkDir instead of filepath.Walk 2022-10-09 17:21:04 +02:00
fuzz_test.go testing: move fuzzers over from OSS-Fuzz 2022-11-30 17:31:03 +01:00
namespaces.go daemon: ensure OCI options play nicely together 2023-06-06 13:10:05 -04:00
oci.go Do not drop effective&permitted set 2023-07-06 13:23:30 -06:00
oci_test.go Fix daemon panic when starting container with invalid device cgroup rule 2021-01-22 16:02:19 +01:00
seccomp_test.go remove pre-go1.17 build-tags 2023-05-19 20:38:51 +02:00