dda228b984
While this is not strictly necessary as the default OCI config masks this
path, it is possible that the user disabled path masking, passed their
own list, or is using a forked (or future) daemon version that has a
modified default config/allows changing the default config.
Add some defense-in-depth by also masking out this problematic hardware
device with the AppArmor LSM.
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Neergaard <bjorn.neergaard@docker.com>
(cherry picked from commit bddd826d7a)
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Neergaard <bjorn.neergaard@docker.com>
60 lines
2.1 KiB
Go
60 lines
2.1 KiB
Go
//go:build linux
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// +build linux
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package apparmor // import "github.com/docker/docker/profiles/apparmor"
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// NOTE: This profile is replicated in containerd and libpod. If you make a
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// change to this profile, please make follow-up PRs to those projects so
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// that these rules can be synchronised (because any issue with this
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// profile will likely affect libpod and containerd).
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// TODO: Move this to a common project so we can maintain it in one spot.
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// baseTemplate defines the default apparmor profile for containers.
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const baseTemplate = `
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{{range $value := .Imports}}
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{{$value}}
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{{end}}
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profile {{.Name}} flags=(attach_disconnected,mediate_deleted) {
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{{range $value := .InnerImports}}
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{{$value}}
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{{end}}
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network,
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capability,
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file,
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umount,
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{{if ge .Version 208096}}
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# Host (privileged) processes may send signals to container processes.
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signal (receive) peer=unconfined,
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# dockerd may send signals to container processes (for "docker kill").
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signal (receive) peer={{.DaemonProfile}},
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# Container processes may send signals amongst themselves.
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signal (send,receive) peer={{.Name}},
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{{end}}
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deny @{PROC}/* w, # deny write for all files directly in /proc (not in a subdir)
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# deny write to files not in /proc/<number>/** or /proc/sys/**
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deny @{PROC}/{[^1-9],[^1-9][^0-9],[^1-9s][^0-9y][^0-9s],[^1-9][^0-9][^0-9][^0-9/]*}/** w,
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deny @{PROC}/sys/[^k]** w, # deny /proc/sys except /proc/sys/k* (effectively /proc/sys/kernel)
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deny @{PROC}/sys/kernel/{?,??,[^s][^h][^m]**} w, # deny everything except shm* in /proc/sys/kernel/
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deny @{PROC}/sysrq-trigger rwklx,
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deny @{PROC}/kcore rwklx,
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deny mount,
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deny /sys/[^f]*/** wklx,
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deny /sys/f[^s]*/** wklx,
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deny /sys/fs/[^c]*/** wklx,
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deny /sys/fs/c[^g]*/** wklx,
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deny /sys/fs/cg[^r]*/** wklx,
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deny /sys/firmware/** rwklx,
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deny /sys/devices/virtual/powercap/** rwklx,
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deny /sys/kernel/security/** rwklx,
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{{if ge .Version 208095}}
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# suppress ptrace denials when using 'docker ps' or using 'ps' inside a container
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ptrace (trace,read,tracedby,readby) peer={{.Name}},
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{{end}}
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}
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`
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