We add a --device flag which can be used like:
docker run --device /dev/sda:/dev/xvda:rwm ubuntu /bin/bash
To allow the container to have read write permissions to access the host's /dev/sda via a node named /dev/xvda in the container.
Note: Much of this code was written by Dinesh Subhraveti dineshs@altiscale.com (github: dineshs-altiscale) and so he deserves a ton of credit.
Docker-DCO-1.1-Signed-off-by: Timothy <timothyhobbs@seznam.cz> (github: timthelion)
In that case /etc/resolv.conf will be generated with no search
option. Usage: --dns-search=.
Docker-DCO-1.1-Signed-off-by: Fabio Falci <fabiofalci@gmail.com> (github: fabiofalci)
We discussed this at the docker plumbers meetup and for tools and
working on the system for things like boot2docker and coreos this is
needed. You can already bypass this check so we felt it is ok to start
allowing this feature.
Docker-DCO-1.1-Signed-off-by: Michael Crosby <michael@docker.com> (github: crosbymichael)
We now have one place that keeps track of (most) devices that are allowed and created within the container. That place is pkg/libcontainer/devices/devices.go
This fixes several inconsistencies between which devices were created in the lxc backend and the native backend. It also fixes inconsistencies between wich devices were created and which were allowed. For example, /dev/full was being created but it was not allowed within the cgroup. It also declares the file modes and permissions of the default devices, rather than copying them from the host. This is in line with docker's philosphy of not being host dependent.
Docker-DCO-1.1-Signed-off-by: Timothy Hobbs <timothyhobbs@seznam.cz> (github: https://github.com/timthelion)
It has been pointed out that some files in /proc and /sys can be used
to break out of containers. However, if those filesystems are mounted
read-only, most of the known exploits are mitigated, since they rely
on writing some file in those filesystems.
This does not replace security modules (like SELinux or AppArmor), it
is just another layer of security. Likewise, it doesn't mean that the
other mitigations (shadowing parts of /proc or /sys with bind mounts)
are useless. Those measures are still useful. As such, the shadowing
of /proc/kcore is still enabled with both LXC and native drivers.
Special care has to be taken with /proc/1/attr, which still needs to
be mounted read-write in order to enable the AppArmor profile. It is
bind-mounted from a private read-write mount of procfs.
All that enforcement is done in dockerinit. The code doing the real
work is in libcontainer. The init function for the LXC driver calls
the function from libcontainer to avoid code duplication.
Docker-DCO-1.1-Signed-off-by: Jérôme Petazzoni <jerome@docker.com> (github: jpetazzo)
Without this patch, containers inherit the open file descriptors of the daemon, so my "exec 42>&2" allows us to "echo >&42 some nasty error with some bad advice" directly into the daemon log. :)
Also, "hack/dind" was already doing this due to issues caused by the inheritance, so I'm removing that hack too since this patch obsoletes it by generalizing it for all containers.
Docker-DCO-1.1-Signed-off-by: Andrew Page <admwiggin@gmail.com> (github: tianon)
