When a container is started in privileged mode, the device mappings
provided by `--device` flag was ignored. Now the device mappings will
be considered even in privileged mode.
Signed-off-by: Akhil Mohan <akhil.mohan@mayadata.io>
Format the source according to latest goimports.
Signed-off-by: Kir Kolyshkin <kolyshkin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
This adds both a daemon-wide flag and a container creation property:
- Set the `CgroupnsMode: "host|private"` HostConfig property at
container creation time to control what cgroup namespace the container
is created in
- Set the `--default-cgroupns-mode=host|private` daemon flag to control
what cgroup namespace containers are created in by default
- Set the default if the daemon flag is unset to "host", for backward
compatibility
- Default to CgroupnsMode: "host" for client versions < 1.40
Signed-off-by: Rob Gulewich <rgulewich@netflix.com>
This is enabled for all containers that are not run with --privileged,
if the kernel supports it.
Fixes#38332
Signed-off-by: Rob Gulewich <rgulewich@netflix.com>
This patch hard-codes support for NVIDIA GPUs.
In a future patch it should move out into its own Device Plugin.
Signed-off-by: Tibor Vass <tibor@docker.com>
Please refer to `docs/rootless.md`.
TLDR:
* Make sure `/etc/subuid` and `/etc/subgid` contain the entry for you
* `dockerd-rootless.sh --experimental`
* `docker -H unix://$XDG_RUNTIME_DIR/docker.sock run ...`
Signed-off-by: Akihiro Suda <suda.akihiro@lab.ntt.co.jp>
- Add support for exact list of capabilities, support only OCI model
- Support OCI model on CapAdd and CapDrop but remain backward compatibility
- Create variable locally instead of declaring it at the top
- Use const for magic "ALL" value
- Rename `cap` variable as it overlaps with `cap()` built-in
- Normalize and validate capabilities before use
- Move validation for conflicting options to validateHostConfig()
- TweakCapabilities: simplify logic to calculate capabilities
Signed-off-by: Olli Janatuinen <olli.janatuinen@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
The OCI doesn't have a specific field for an NIS domainname[1] (mainly
because FreeBSD and Solaris appear to have a similar concept but it is
configured entirely differently).
However, on Linux, the NIS domainname can be configured through both the
setdomainname(2) syscall but also through the "kernel.domainname"
sysctl. Since the OCI has a way of injecting sysctls this means we don't
need to have any OCI changes to support NIS domainnames (and we can
always switch if the OCI picks up such support in the future).
It should be noted that because we have to generate this each spec
creation we also have to make sure that it's not clobbered by the
HostConfig. I'm pretty sure making this change generic (so that
HostConfig will not clobber any pre-set sysctls) will not cause other
issues to crop up.
[1]: https://github.com/opencontainers/runtime-spec/issues/592
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <asarai@suse.de>
This allows non-recursive bind-mount, i.e. mount(2) with "bind" rather than "rbind".
Swarm-mode will be supported in a separate PR because of mutual vendoring.
Signed-off-by: Akihiro Suda <suda.akihiro@lab.ntt.co.jp>
Since PR 11353 (commit 7804cd36ee "Filter out default mounts that
are override by user") there can be no duplicated mounts in the list,
so the check is redundant.
This should speed up container start by a nanosecond or two.
Signed-off-by: Kir Kolyshkin <kolyshkin@gmail.com>
In case a user wants to have a child reaper inside a container
(i.e. run "docker --init") AND a bind-mounted /dev, the following
error occurs:
> docker run -d -v /dev:/dev --init busybox top
> 088c96808c683077f04c4cc2711fddefe1f5970afc085d59e0baae779745a7cf
> docker: Error response from daemon: OCI runtime create failed: container_linux.go:296: starting container process caused "exec: "/dev/init": stat /dev/init: no such file or directory": unknown.
This happens because if a user-suppled /dev is provided, all the
built-in /dev/xxx mounts are filtered out.
To solve, let's move in-container init to /sbin, as the chance that
/sbin will be bind-mounted to a container is smaller than that for /dev.
While at it, let's give it more unique name (docker-init).
NOTE it still won't work for the case of bind-mounted /sbin.
Signed-off-by: Kir Kolyshkin <kolyshkin@gmail.com>
This implements chown support on Windows. Built-in accounts as well
as accounts included in the SAM database of the container are supported.
NOTE: IDPair is now named Identity and IDMappings is now named
IdentityMapping.
The following are valid examples:
ADD --chown=Guest . <some directory>
COPY --chown=Administrator . <some directory>
COPY --chown=Guests . <some directory>
COPY --chown=ContainerUser . <some directory>
On Windows an owner is only granted the permission to read the security
descriptor and read/write the discretionary access control list. This
fix also grants read/write and execute permissions to the owner.
Signed-off-by: Salahuddin Khan <salah@docker.com>
This adds MaskedPaths and ReadOnlyPaths options to HostConfig for containers so
that a user can override the default values.
When the value sent through the API is nil the default is used.
Otherwise the default is overridden.
Adds integration tests for MaskedPaths and ReadonlyPaths.
Signed-off-by: Jess Frazelle <acidburn@microsoft.com>
A recent optimization in getSourceMount() made it return an error
in case when the found mount point is "/". This prevented bind-mounted
volumes from working in such cases.
A (rather trivial but adeqate) unit test case is added.
Fixes: 871c957242 ("getSourceMount(): simplify")
Signed-off-by: Kir Kolyshkin <kolyshkin@gmail.com>
It does not make sense to copy a slice element by element, then discard
the source one. Let's do copy in place instead which is way more
efficient.
Signed-off-by: Kir Kolyshkin <kolyshkin@gmail.com>
The flow of getSourceMount was:
1 get all entries from /proc/self/mountinfo
2 do a linear search for the `source` directory
3 if found, return its data
4 get the parent directory of `source`, goto 2
The repeated linear search through the whole mountinfo (which can have
thousands of records) is inefficient. Instead, let's just
1 collect all the relevant records (only those mount points
that can be a parent of `source`)
2 find the record with the longest mountpath, return its data
This was tested manually with something like
```go
func TestGetSourceMount(t *testing.T) {
mnt, flags, err := getSourceMount("/sys/devices/msr/")
assert.NoError(t, err)
t.Logf("mnt: %v, flags: %v", mnt, flags)
}
```
...but it relies on having a specific mount points on the system
being used for testing.
[v2: add unit tests for ParentsFilter]
Signed-off-by: Kir Kolyshkin <kolyshkin@gmail.com>
Functions `GetMounts()` and `parseMountTable()` return all the entries
as read and parsed from /proc/self/mountinfo. In many cases the caller
is only interested only one or a few entries, not all of them.
One good example is `Mounted()` function, which looks for a specific
entry only. Another example is `RecursiveUnmount()` which is only
interested in mount under a specific path.
This commit adds `filter` argument to `GetMounts()` to implement
two things:
1. filter out entries a caller is not interested in
2. stop processing if a caller is found what it wanted
`nil` can be passed to get a backward-compatible behavior, i.e. return
all the entries.
A few filters are implemented:
- `PrefixFilter`: filters out all entries not under `prefix`
- `SingleEntryFilter`: looks for a specific entry
Finally, `Mounted()` is modified to use `SingleEntryFilter()`, and
`RecursiveUnmount()` is using `PrefixFilter()`.
Unit tests are added to check filters are working.
[v2: ditch NoFilter, use nil]
[v3: ditch GetMountsFiltered()]
[v4: add unit test for filters]
[v5: switch to gotestyourself]
Signed-off-by: Kir Kolyshkin <kolyshkin@gmail.com>
This moves the platform specific stuff in a separate package and keeps
the `volume` package and the defined interfaces light to import.
Signed-off-by: Brian Goff <cpuguy83@gmail.com>
It does not make any sense to vary this based on whether the
rootfs is read only. We removed all the other mount dependencies
on read-only eg see #35344.
Signed-off-by: Justin Cormack <justin.cormack@docker.com>
As soon as the initial executable in the container is executed as a non root user,
permitted and effective capabilities are dropped. Drop them earlier than this, so
that they are dropped before executing the file. The main effect of this is that
if `CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE` is set (the default) the user will not be able to execute
files they do not have permission to execute, which previously they could.
The old behaviour was somewhat surprising and the new one is definitely correct,
but it is not in any meaningful way exploitable, and I do not think it is
necessary to backport this fix. It is unlikely to have any negative effects as
almost all executables have world execute permission anyway.
Use the bounding set not the effective set as the canonical set of capabilities, as
effective will now vary.
Signed-off-by: Justin Cormack <justin.cormack@docker.com>
Commit 7a7357dae1 ("LCOW: Implemented support for docker cp + build")
changed `container.BaseFS` from being a string (that could be empty but
can't lead to nil pointer dereference) to containerfs.ContainerFS,
which could be be `nil` and so nil dereference is at least theoretically
possible, which leads to panic (i.e. engine crashes).
Such a panic can be avoided by carefully analysing the source code in all
the places that dereference a variable, to make the variable can't be nil.
Practically, this analisys are impossible as code is constantly
evolving.
Still, we need to avoid panics and crashes. A good way to do so is to
explicitly check that a variable is non-nil, returning an error
otherwise. Even in case such a check looks absolutely redundant,
further changes to the code might make it useful, and having an
extra check is not a big price to pay to avoid a panic.
This commit adds such checks for all the places where it is not obvious
that container.BaseFS is not nil (which in this case means we do not
call daemon.Mount() a few lines earlier).
Signed-off-by: Kir Kolyshkin <kolyshkin@gmail.com>
It has been pointed out that if --read-only flag is given, /dev/shm
also becomes read-only in case of --ipc private.
This happens because in this case the mount comes from OCI spec
(since commit 7120976d74), and is a regression caused by that
commit.
The meaning of --read-only flag is to only have a "main" container
filesystem read-only, not the auxiliary stuff (that includes /dev/shm,
other mounts and volumes, --tmpfs, /proc, /dev and so on).
So, let's make sure /dev/shm that comes from OCI spec is not made
read-only.
Fixes: 7120976d74 ("Implement none, private, and shareable ipc modes")
Signed-off-by: Kir Kolyshkin <kolyshkin@gmail.com>
On unix, merge secrets/configs handling. This is important because
configs can contain secrets (via templating) and potentially a config
could just simply have secret information "by accident" from the user.
This just make sure that configs are as secure as secrets and de-dups a
lot of code.
Generally this makes everything simpler and configs more secure.
Signed-off-by: Brian Goff <cpuguy83@gmail.com>
