Signed-off-by: Akihiro Suda <akihiro.suda.cz@hco.ntt.co.jp>
(cherry picked from commit 00225e220f)
Signed-off-by: Akihiro Suda <akihiro.suda.cz@hco.ntt.co.jp>
The following warnings in `docker info` are now discarded,
because there is no action user can actually take.
On cgroup v1:
- "WARNING: No blkio weight support"
- "WARNING: No blkio weight_device support"
On cgroup v2:
- "WARNING: No kernel memory TCP limit support"
- "WARNING: No oom kill disable support"
`docker run` still prints warnings when the missing feature is being attempted to use.
Signed-off-by: Akihiro Suda <akihiro.suda.cz@hco.ntt.co.jp>
(cherry picked from commit 8086443a44)
Signed-off-by: Akihiro Suda <akihiro.suda.cz@hco.ntt.co.jp>
Fix#41803
Also attempt to mknod devices.
Mknodding devices are likely to fail, but still worth trying when
running with a seccomp user notification.
Signed-off-by: Akihiro Suda <akihiro.suda.cz@hco.ntt.co.jp>
(cherry picked from commit d5d5cccb7e)
Signed-off-by: Akihiro Suda <akihiro.suda.cz@hco.ntt.co.jp>
Now `systemctl --user stop docker` completes just with in 1 or 2 seconds.
Fix issue 41944 ("Docker rootless does not exit properly if containers are running")
See systemd.kill(5) https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/systemd.kill.html
Signed-off-by: Akihiro Suda <akihiro.suda.cz@hco.ntt.co.jp>
(cherry picked from commit 05566adf71)
Signed-off-by: Akihiro Suda <akihiro.suda.cz@hco.ntt.co.jp>
Various dirs in /var/lib/docker contain data that needs to be mounted
into a container. For this reason, these dirs are set to be owned by the
remapped root user, otherwise there can be permissions issues.
However, this uneccessarily exposes these dirs to an unprivileged user
on the host.
Instead, set the ownership of these dirs to the real root (or rather the
UID/GID of dockerd) with 0701 permissions, which allows the remapped
root to enter the directories but not read/write to them.
The remapped root needs to enter these dirs so the container's rootfs
can be configured... e.g. to mount /etc/resolve.conf.
This prevents an unprivileged user from having read/write access to
these dirs on the host.
The flip side of this is now any user can enter these directories.
Signed-off-by: Brian Goff <cpuguy83@gmail.com>
The remapped root does not need access to this dir.
Having this owned by the remapped root opens the host up to an
uprivileged user on the host being able to escalate privileges.
While it would not be normal for the remapped UID to be used outside of
the container context, it could happen.
Signed-off-by: Brian Goff <cpuguy83@gmail.com>
Generally if we ever need to change perms of a dir, between versions,
this ensures the permissions actually change when we think it should
change without having to handle special cases if it already existed.
Signed-off-by: Brian Goff <cpuguy83@gmail.com>
Adds a test case for the case where dockerd gets stuck on startup due to
hanging `daemon.shutdownContainer`
Signed-off-by: Brian Goff <cpuguy83@gmail.com>
full diff: https://github.com/opencontainers/selinux/compare/v1.6.0...v1.7.0
- Implement get_default_context_with_level() from libselinux
- Wrap some syscalls (lgetattr, lsetattr, fstatfs, statfs) to retry on EINTR.
- Improve code quality by turning fixing many problems found by linters
- Use bufio.Scanner for parsing labels and policy confilabelg
- Cache the value for SELinux policy directory
- test on ppc64le and go 1.15
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
Signal systemd when we start shutting down to complement the "READY" notify
that was originally implemented in 97088ebef7
From [sd_notify(3)](https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/sd_notify.html#STOPPING=1)
> STOPPING=1
> Tells the service manager that the service is beginning its shutdown. This is useful
> to allow the service manager to track the service's internal state, and present it to
> the user.
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
This is a fix for https://github.com/docker/for-linux/issues/1012.
The code was not considering that C strings are NULL-terminated so
we need to leave one extra byte.
Without this fix, the testcase in https://github.com/docker/for-linux/issues/1012
fails with
```
Step 61/1001 : RUN echo 60 > 60
---> Running in dde85ac3b1e3
Removing intermediate container dde85ac3b1e3
---> 80a12a18a241
Step 62/1001 : RUN echo 61 > 61
error creating overlay mount to /23456789112345678921234/overlay2/d368abcc97d6c6ebcf23fa71225e2011d095295d5d8c9b31d6810bea748bdf07-init/merged: no such file or directory
```
with the output of `dmesg -T` as:
```
[Sat Dec 19 02:35:40 2020] overlayfs: failed to resolve '/23456789112345678921234/overlay2/89e435a1b24583c463abb73e8abfad8bf8a88312ef8253455390c5fa0a765517-init/wor': -2
```
with this fix, you get the expected:
```
Step 126/1001 : RUN echo 125 > 125
---> Running in 2f2e56da89e0
max depth exceeded
```
Signed-off-by: Oscar Bonilla <6f6231@gmail.com>
Previous startup sequence used to call "containerStop" on containers that were persisted with a running state but are not alive when restarting (can happen on non-clean shutdown).
This call was made before fixing-up the RunningState of the container, and tricked the daemon to trying to kill a non-existing process and ultimately hang.
The fix is very simple - just add a condition on calling containerStop.
Signed-off-by: Simon Ferquel <simon.ferquel@docker.com>
Capabilities are serialised in VFS_CAP_REVISION_3 when an image is
built in a user-namespaced daemon, instead of VFS_CAP_REVISION_2.
This adds a test for this, though it's currently wired to fail if
the capabilities are serialised in VFS_CAP_REVISION_2 instead in this
situation, since this is unexpected.
Signed-off-by: Eric Mountain <eric.mountain@datadoghq.com>
These tests fail when run by a non-root user
=== RUN TestUntarWithMaliciousSymlinks
archive_unix_test.go:63: assertion failed: expected error to contain "open /safe/host-file: no such file or directory", got "Error processing tar file(exit status 1): Error creating mount namespace before pivot: operation not permitted"
--- FAIL: TestUntarWithMaliciousSymlinks (0.00s)
=== RUN TestTarWithMaliciousSymlinks
archive_unix_test.go:90: /tmp/TestTarWithMaliciousSymlinks400408188
=== RUN TestTarWithMaliciousSymlinks//tmp/TestTarWithMaliciousSymlinks400408188/root/safe_host-file
archive_unix_test.go:155: assertion failed: error is not nil: error processing tar file: Error after fallback to chroot: operation not permitted: exit status 1
=== RUN TestTarWithMaliciousSymlinks//tmp/TestTarWithMaliciousSymlinks400408188/root/safe/_host-file
archive_unix_test.go:155: assertion failed: error is not nil: error processing tar file: Error after fallback to chroot: operation not permitted: exit status 1
=== RUN TestTarWithMaliciousSymlinks//tmp/TestTarWithMaliciousSymlinks400408188/root/safe_
archive_unix_test.go:155: assertion failed: error is not nil: error processing tar file: Error after fallback to chroot: operation not permitted: exit status 1
=== RUN TestTarWithMaliciousSymlinks//tmp/TestTarWithMaliciousSymlinks400408188/root/safe/_
archive_unix_test.go:155: assertion failed: error is not nil: error processing tar file: Error after fallback to chroot: operation not permitted: exit status 1
=== RUN TestTarWithMaliciousSymlinks//tmp/TestTarWithMaliciousSymlinks400408188/root_safe/host-file
archive_unix_test.go:155: assertion failed: error is not nil: error processing tar file: Error after fallback to chroot: operation not permitted: exit status 1
=== RUN TestTarWithMaliciousSymlinks//tmp/TestTarWithMaliciousSymlinks400408188/root_/safe/host-file
archive_unix_test.go:155: assertion failed: error is not nil: error processing tar file: Error after fallback to chroot: operation not permitted: exit status 1
=== RUN TestTarWithMaliciousSymlinks//tmp/TestTarWithMaliciousSymlinks400408188/root_
archive_unix_test.go:155: assertion failed: error is not nil: error processing tar file: Error after fallback to chroot: operation not permitted: exit status 1
--- FAIL: TestTarWithMaliciousSymlinks (0.02s)
--- FAIL: TestTarWithMaliciousSymlinks//tmp/TestTarWithMaliciousSymlinks400408188/root/safe_host-file (0.00s)
--- FAIL: TestTarWithMaliciousSymlinks//tmp/TestTarWithMaliciousSymlinks400408188/root/safe/_host-file (0.00s)
--- FAIL: TestTarWithMaliciousSymlinks//tmp/TestTarWithMaliciousSymlinks400408188/root/safe_ (0.00s)
--- FAIL: TestTarWithMaliciousSymlinks//tmp/TestTarWithMaliciousSymlinks400408188/root/safe/_ (0.00s)
--- FAIL: TestTarWithMaliciousSymlinks//tmp/TestTarWithMaliciousSymlinks400408188/root_safe/host-file (0.00s)
--- FAIL: TestTarWithMaliciousSymlinks//tmp/TestTarWithMaliciousSymlinks400408188/root_/safe/host-file (0.00s)
--- FAIL: TestTarWithMaliciousSymlinks//tmp/TestTarWithMaliciousSymlinks400408188/root_ (0.00s)
FAIL
FAIL github.com/docker/docker/pkg/chrootarchive 0.042s
Signed-off-by: Arnaud Rebillout <elboulangero@gmail.com>
These tests fail when run by a non-root user
=== RUN TestTmpfsDevShmNoDupMount
oci_linux_test.go:29: assertion failed: error is not nil: mkdir /var/lib/docker: permission denied
--- FAIL: TestTmpfsDevShmNoDupMount (0.00s)
=== RUN TestIpcPrivateVsReadonly
oci_linux_test.go:29: assertion failed: error is not nil: mkdir /var/lib/docker: permission denied
--- FAIL: TestIpcPrivateVsReadonly (0.00s)
=== RUN TestSysctlOverride
oci_linux_test.go:29: assertion failed: error is not nil: mkdir /var/lib/docker: permission denied
--- FAIL: TestSysctlOverride (0.00s)
=== RUN TestSysctlOverrideHost
oci_linux_test.go:29: assertion failed: error is not nil: mkdir /var/lib/docker: permission denied
--- FAIL: TestSysctlOverrideHost (0.00s)
Signed-off-by: Arnaud Rebillout <elboulangero@gmail.com>
