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Merge pull request #22711 from thaJeztah/docs-cherry-picks

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Docs cherry picks
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Sven Dowideit 2016-05-13 21:40:22 +10:00
commit 54a58f9886
9 changed files with 92 additions and 11 deletions
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2
docs/deprecated.md
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@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ The lxc-conf flag and API fields will also be removed.
### Old Command Line Options
**Deprecated In Release: [v1.8.0](https://github.com/docker/docker/releases/tag/v1.8.0)**
**Target For Removal In Release: v1.10**
**Removed In Release: [v1.10.0](https://github.com/docker/docker/releases/tag/v1.10.0)**
The flags `-d` and `--daemon` are deprecated in favor of the `daemon` subcommand:

4
docs/extend/plugins_authorization.md
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@ -151,8 +151,7 @@ should implement the following two methods:
"RequestMethod": "The HTTP method",
"RequestURI": "The HTTP request URI",
"RequestBody": "Byte array containing the raw HTTP request body",
"RequestHeader": "Byte array containing the raw HTTP request header as a map[string][]string ",
"RequestStatusCode": "Request status code"
"RequestHeader": "Byte array containing the raw HTTP request header as a map[string][]string "
}
```
@ -177,7 +176,6 @@ should implement the following two methods:
"RequestURI": "The HTTP request URI",
"RequestBody": "Byte array containing the raw HTTP request body",
"RequestHeader": "Byte array containing the raw HTTP request header as a map[string][]string",
"RequestStatusCode": "Request status code",
"ResponseBody": "Byte array containing the raw HTTP response body",
"ResponseHeader": "Byte array containing the raw HTTP response header as a map[string][]string",
"ResponseStatusCode":"Response status code"

2
docs/migration.md
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@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ instructions that didn’t modify the filesystem.
Content addressability is the foundation for the new distribution features. The
image pull and push code has been reworked to use a download/upload manager
concept that makes pushing and pulling images much more stable and mitigate any
concept that makes pushing and pulling images much more stable and mitigates any
parallel request issues. The download manager also brings retries on failed
downloads and better prioritization for concurrent downloads.

2
docs/reference/builder.md
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@ -834,7 +834,7 @@ does some more work:
# USE the trap if you need to also do manual cleanup after the service is stopped,
# or need to start multiple services in the one container
trap "echo TRAPed signal" HUP INT QUIT KILL TERM
trap "echo TRAPed signal" HUP INT QUIT TERM
# start service in background here
/usr/sbin/apachectl start

2
docs/security/apparmor.md
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@ -232,7 +232,7 @@ Congrats! You just deployed a container secured with a custom apparmor profile!
## Debug AppArmor
You can use `demsg` to debug problems and `aa-status` check the loaded profiles.
You can use `dmesg` to debug problems and `aa-status` check the loaded profiles.
### Use dmesg

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docs/security/non-events.md Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
<!--[metadata]>
+++
title = "Docker Security Non-events"
description = "Review of security vulnerabilities Docker mitigated"
keywords = ["Docker, Docker documentation, security, security non-events"]
[menu.main]
parent = "smn_secure_docker"
+++
<![end-metadata]-->
# Docker Security Non-events
This page lists security vulnerabilities which Docker mitigated, such that
processes run in Docker containers were never vulnerable to the bug—even before
it was fixed. This assumes containers are run without adding extra capabilities
or not run as `--privileged`.
The list below is not even remotely complete. Rather, it is a sample of the few
bugs we've actually noticed to have attracted security review and publicly
disclosed vulnerabilities. In all likelihood, the bugs that haven't been
reported far outnumber those that have. Luckily, since Docker's approach to
secure by default through apparmor, seccomp, and dropping capabilities, it
likely mitigates unknown bugs just as well as it does known ones.
Bugs mitigated:
* [CVE-2013-1956](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2013-1956),
[1957](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2013-1957),
[1958](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2013-1958),
[1959](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2013-1959),
[1979](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2013-1979),
[CVE-2014-4014](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2014-4014),
[5206](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2014-5206),
[5207](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2014-5207),
[7970](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2014-7970),
[7975](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2014-7975),
[CVE-2015-2925](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2015-2925),
[8543](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2015-8543),
[CVE-2016-3134](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2016-3134),
[3135](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2016-3135), etc.:
The introduction of unprivileged user namespaces lead to a huge increase in the
attack surface available to unprivileged users by giving such users legitimate
access to previously root-only system calls like `mount()`. All of these CVEs
are examples of security vulnerabilities due to introduction of user namespaces.
Docker can use user namespaces to set up containers, but then disallows the
process inside the container from creating its own nested namespaces through the
default seccomp profile, rendering these vulnerabilities unexploitable.
* [CVE-2014-0181](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2014-0181),
[CVE-2015-3339](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2015-3339):
These are bugs that require the presence of a setuid binary. Docker disables
setuid binaries inside containers via the `NO_NEW_PRIVS` process flag and
other mechanisms.
* [CVE-2014-4699](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2014-4699):
A bug in `ptrace()` could allow privilege escalation. Docker disables `ptrace()`
inside the container using apparmor, seccomp and by dropping `CAP_PTRACE`.
Three times the layers of protection there!
* [CVE-2014-9529](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2014-9529):
A series of crafted `keyctl()` calls could cause kernel DoS / memory corruption.
Docker disables `keyctl()` inside containers using seccomp.
* [CVE-2015-3214](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2015-3214),
[4036](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2015-4036): These are
bugs in common virtualization drivers which could allow a guest OS user to
execute code on the host OS. Exploiting them requires access to virtualization
devices in the guest. Docker hides direct access to these devices when run
without `--privileged`. Interestingly, these seem to be cases where containers
are "more secure" than a VM, going against common wisdom that VMs are
"more secure" than containers.
* [CVE-2016-0728](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2016-0728):
Use-after-free caused by crafted `keyctl()` calls could lead to privilege
escalation. Docker disables `keyctl()` inside containers using the default
seccomp profile.
* [CVE-2016-2383](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2016-2383):
A bug in eBPF -- the special in-kernel DSL used to express things like seccomp
filters -- allowed arbitrary reads of kernel memory. The `bpf()` system call
is blocked inside Docker containers using (ironically) seccomp.
Bugs *not* mitigated:
* [CVE-2015-3290](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2015-3290),
[5157](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2015-5157): Bugs in
the kernel's non-maskable interrupt handling allowed privilege escalation.
Can be exploited in Docker containers because the `modify_ldt()` system call is
not currently blocked using seccomp.

1
docs/security/seccomp.md
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@ -99,7 +99,6 @@ the reason each syscall is blocked rather than white-listed.
| `keyctl` | Prevent containers from using the kernel keyring, which is not namespaced. |
| `lookup_dcookie` | Tracing/profiling syscall, which could leak a lot of information on the host. |
| `mbind` | Syscall that modifies kernel memory and NUMA settings. Already gated by `CAP_SYS_NICE`. |
| `modify_ldt` | Old syscall only used in 16-bit code and a potential information leak. |
| `mount` | Deny mounting, already gated by `CAP_SYS_ADMIN`. |
| `move_pages` | Syscall that modifies kernel memory and NUMA settings. |
| `name_to_handle_at` | Sister syscall to `open_by_handle_at`. Already gated by `CAP_SYS_NICE`. |

4
docs/security/security.md
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@ -52,8 +52,8 @@ How mature is the code providing kernel namespaces and private
networking? Kernel namespaces were introduced [between kernel version
2.6.15 and
2.6.26](http://lxc.sourceforge.net/index.php/about/kernel-namespaces/).
This means that since July 2008 (date of the 2.6.26 release, now 7 years
ago), namespace code has been exercised and scrutinized on a large
This means that since July 2008 (date of the 2.6.26 release
), namespace code has been exercised and scrutinized on a large
number of production systems. And there is more: the design and
inspiration for the namespaces code are even older. Namespaces are
actually an effort to reimplement the features of [OpenVZ](

3
docs/userguide/networking/work-with-networks.md
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@ -228,7 +228,8 @@ $ docker run --net=isolated_nw --ip=172.25.3.3 -itd --name=container3 busybox
As you can see you were able to specify the ip address for your container.
As long as the network to which the container is connecting was created with
a user specified subnet, you will be able to select the IPv4 and/or IPv6 address(es)
for your container when executing `docker run` and `docker network connect` commands.
for your container when executing `docker run` and `docker network connect` commands
by respectively passing the `--ip` and `--ip6` flags for IPv4 and IPv6.
The selected IP address is part of the container networking configuration and will be
preserved across container reload. The feature is only available on user defined networks,
because they guarantee their subnets configuration does not change across daemon reload.