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- From d70cb56d43efddd10d4263f2af24f52fb81137b9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
- From: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
- Date: Fri, 31 May 2013 19:12:12 +0100
- Subject: [PATCH] add sysctl to disallow unprivileged CLONE_NEWUSER by default
- add sysctl to disallow unprivileged CLONE_NEWUSER by default
- This is a short-term patch. Unprivileged use of CLONE_NEWUSER
- is certainly an intended feature of user namespaces. However
- for at least saucy we want to make sure that, if any security
- issues are found, we have a fail-safe.
- Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
- [bwh: Remove unneeded binary sysctl bits]
- [bwh: Keep this sysctl, but change the default to enabled]
- ---
- kernel/fork.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++
- kernel/sysctl.c | 13 +++++++++++++
- kernel/user_namespace.c | 3 +++
- 3 files changed, 32 insertions(+)
- diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c
- index ca2ca3884f76..d9591a8a6ead 100644
- --- a/kernel/fork.c
- +++ b/kernel/fork.c
- @@ -119,6 +119,12 @@
-
- #include <kunit/visibility.h>
-
- +#ifdef CONFIG_USER_NS
- +extern int unprivileged_userns_clone;
- +#else
- +#define unprivileged_userns_clone 0
- +#endif
- +
- /*
- * Minimum number of threads to boot the kernel
- */
- @@ -2171,6 +2177,10 @@ __latent_entropy struct task_struct *copy_process(
- if ((clone_flags & (CLONE_NEWUSER|CLONE_FS)) == (CLONE_NEWUSER|CLONE_FS))
- return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
-
- + if ((clone_flags & CLONE_NEWUSER) && !unprivileged_userns_clone)
- + if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
- + return ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
- +
- /*
- * Thread groups must share signals as well, and detached threads
- * can only be started up within the thread group.
- @@ -3324,6 +3334,12 @@ int ksys_unshare(unsigned long unshare_flags)
- if (unshare_flags & CLONE_NEWNS)
- unshare_flags |= CLONE_FS;
-
- + if ((unshare_flags & CLONE_NEWUSER) && !unprivileged_userns_clone) {
- + err = -EPERM;
- + if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
- + goto bad_unshare_out;
- + }
- +
- err = check_unshare_flags(unshare_flags);
- if (err)
- goto bad_unshare_out;
- diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c
- index cb57da499ebb..5e9ae0e6a727 100644
- --- a/kernel/sysctl.c
- +++ b/kernel/sysctl.c
- @@ -135,6 +135,10 @@ static enum sysctl_writes_mode sysctl_writes_strict = SYSCTL_WRITES_STRICT;
- int sysctl_legacy_va_layout;
- #endif
-
- +#ifdef CONFIG_USER_NS
- +extern int unprivileged_userns_clone;
- +#endif
- +
- #endif /* CONFIG_SYSCTL */
-
- /*
- @@ -1617,6 +1621,15 @@ static const struct ctl_table kern_table[] = {
- .mode = 0644,
- .proc_handler = proc_dointvec,
- },
- +#ifdef CONFIG_USER_NS
- + {
- + .procname = "unprivileged_userns_clone",
- + .data = &unprivileged_userns_clone,
- + .maxlen = sizeof(int),
- + .mode = 0644,
- + .proc_handler = proc_dointvec,
- + },
- +#endif
- #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_SYSCTL
- {
- .procname = "tainted",
- diff --git a/kernel/user_namespace.c b/kernel/user_namespace.c
- index aa0b2e47f2f2..222bb2b40b73 100644
- --- a/kernel/user_namespace.c
- +++ b/kernel/user_namespace.c
- @@ -22,6 +22,9 @@
- #include <linux/bsearch.h>
- #include <linux/sort.h>
-
- +/* sysctl */
- +int unprivileged_userns_clone = 1;
- +
- static struct kmem_cache *user_ns_cachep __ro_after_init;
- static DEFINE_MUTEX(userns_state_mutex);
-
- --
- 2.49.0
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