Before we start disabling acquisition of the big process lock for
specific syscalls, make sure to document and assert that all the
lock is held during all syscalls.
This replaces all uses of LexicalPath in the Kernel with the functions
from KLexicalPath. This also allows the Kernel to stop including
AK::LexicalPath.
This changes the m_parts, m_dirname, m_basename, m_title and m_extension
member variables to StringViews onto the m_string String. It also
removes the m_is_absolute member in favour of computing if a path is
absolute in the is_absolute() getter. Due to this, the canonicalize()
method has been completely rewritten.
The parts() getter still returns a Vector<String>, although it is no
longer a const reference as m_parts is no longer a Vector<String>.
Rather, it is constructed from the StringViews in m_parts upon request.
The parts_view() getter has been added, which returns Vector<StringView>
const&. Most previous users of parts() have been changed to use
parts_view(), except where Strings are required.
Due to this change, it's is now no longer allow to create temporary
LexicalPath objects to call the dirname, basename, title, or extension
getters on them because the returned StringViews will point to possible
freed memory.
The LexicalPath instance methods dirname(), basename(), title() and
extension() will be changed to return StringView const& in a further
commit. Due to this, users creating temporary LexicalPath objects just
to call one of those getters will recieve a StringView const& pointing
to a possible freed buffer.
To avoid this, static methods for those APIs have been added, which will
return a String by value to avoid those problems. All cases where
temporary LexicalPath objects have been used as described above haven
been changed to use the static APIs.
The Process::Handler type has KResultOr<FlatPtr> as its return type.
Using a different return type with an equally-sized template parameter
sort of works but breaks once that condition is no longer true, e.g.
for KResultOr<int> on x86_64.
Ideally the syscall handlers would also take FlatPtrs as their args
so we can get rid of the reinterpret_cast for the function pointer
but I didn't quite feel like cleaning that up as well.
This also changes the UnveilState to Dropped when the path unveil() is
called for already has a node.
This fixes a bug where unveiling "/" would previously keep the
UnveilState as None, which meant that everything was still accessible
until unveil() was called with any non-root path (or nullptr).
When changing the unveil permissions of a preexisting node, we need to
make sure that any intermediate nodes that were created before and
should inherit permissions from the updated node are updated properly.
This fixes the following bug:
unveil("/home/anon/Documents", "r");
unveil("/home", "r");
Now there was a intermediate node for "/home/anon" which still had no
permission, even though it should have inherited the permissions from
"/home".
This fixes a bug where unveiling a subdirectory of an already unveiled
path would sometimes be allowed and sometimes not (depending on what
other unveil calls have been made).
Now, it is always allowed to unveil a subdirectory of an already
unveiled directory, even if it has higher permissions.
This removes the need for the permissions_inherited_from_root flag in
UnveilMetadata, so it has been removed.
SPDX License Identifiers are a more compact / standardized
way of representing file license information.
See: https://spdx.dev/resources/use/#identifiers
This was done with the `ambr` search and replace tool.
ambr --no-parent-ignore --key-from-file --rep-from-file key.txt rep.txt *
(...and ASSERT_NOT_REACHED => VERIFY_NOT_REACHED)
Since all of these checks are done in release builds as well,
let's rename them to VERIFY to prevent confusion, as everyone is
used to assertions being compiled out in release.
We can introduce a new ASSERT macro that is specifically for debug
checks, but I'm doing this wholesale conversion first since we've
accumulated thousands of these already, and it's not immediately
obvious which ones are suitable for ASSERT.
This can happen when an unveil follows another with a path that is a
sub-path of the other one:
```c++
unveil("/home/anon/.config/whoa.ini", "rw");
unveil("/home/anon", "r"); // this would fail, as "/home/anon" inherits
// the permissions of "/", which is None.
```
This is a new "browse" permission that lets you open (and subsequently list
contents of) directories underneath the path, but not regular files or any other
types of files.
This addresses the issue first enountered in #3644. If a path is
first unveiled with "c" permissions, we should NOT return ENOENT
if the node does not exist on the disk, as the program will most
likely be creating it at a later time.
Since the CPU already does almost all necessary validation steps
for us, we don't really need to attempt to do this. Doing it
ourselves doesn't really work very reliably, because we'd have to
account for other processors modifying virtual memory, and we'd
have to account for e.g. pages not being able to be allocated
due to insufficient resources.
So change the copy_to/from_user (and associated helper functions)
to use the new safe_memcpy, which will return whether it succeeded
or not. The only manual validation step needed (which the CPU
can't perform for us) is making sure the pointers provided by user
mode aren't pointing to kernel mappings.
To make it easier to read/write from/to either kernel or user mode
data add the UserOrKernelBuffer helper class, which will internally
either use copy_from/to_user or directly memcpy, or pass the data
through directly using a temporary buffer on the stack.
Last but not least we need to keep syscall params trivial as we
need to copy them from/to user mode using copy_from/to_user.
This is something I've been meaning to do for a long time, and here we
finally go. This patch moves all sys$foo functions out of Process.cpp
and into files in Kernel/Syscalls/.
It's not exactly one syscall per file (although it could be, but I got
a bit tired of the repetitive work here..)
This makes hacking on individual syscalls a lot less painful since you
don't have to rebuild nearly as much code every time. I'm also hopeful
that this makes it easier to understand individual syscalls. :^)
